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An investor can either rely on her own analysis or on the analyses of others. Sell-side 
analysts provide the latter as public experts of investing and forecasting. It is little won-
der that they have been a constant topic of interest in financial research. Equity analysts 
provide markets with forecasts regarding particular stocks, recommendations to trade 
said stocks and quantitative and qualitative analyses to supplement the information pro-
vided by companies. As sell-side analysts often publish their work, first to their custom-
ers and later to media, they provide a rich historical data set (collected for example in 
I/B/E/S) for finance researchers to study among other things expectations, equity valua-
tion, forecasting, and market efficiency. For example analyst consensus estimates can be 
interpreted handily as proxies for the market’s expectations on securities instead of try-
ing to gather them from individual investors. 
Analysts have different capabilities, advantages, biases and audiences. This thesis fo-
cuses on the importance of proximity for sell-side equity analysts and on the possibility 
of profiting from this possible local advantage. Proximity is interpreted here as cultural 
and/or geographical closeness to securities analyzed. Sell-side analysts are analysts that 
provide more or less public analyses to enhance and facilitate trade of securities. They 
usually receive salaries from banks and brokerage houses that profit from more active 
trading. As sell-side analysts’ audiences usually consist of retail investors, questions of 
neutrality and investor protection are often raised. Analysts’ views on securities are not 
neutral and unproblematic due to these conflicts of interest. It is not surprising that the 
research has additionally been interested in unethical incentives, predictive capabilities 
and biases of analysts. The evaluation of analysts and the investment value of their 
analyses has many practical implications as target price usefulness is seldom analyzed 
or reported for example in the media. 
Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) provide a taxonomy of then-current research on 
analysts. They investigated around 250 research papers on analysts and compared then-
recent results and research questions to previous taxonomies of Schipper (1991) and 
Brown (1993). Ramnath, Rock and Shane identify important future research questions: 
providing more insight into analysts’ decision process, clarifying the role of heuristics 
and understanding the interaction between analysts’ incentives and market’s inefficien-
cies regarding them. They also expect research to continue on what makes certain ana-
lysts better than others and to continue on impacts of other measures than EPS (Earn-
ings per Share). 
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This thesis expands on some of these themes by focusing on differences between lo-
cal and foreign analysts by examining target price data. Investment value of these target 
prices is tested by utilizing them in portfolio investing simulation. Target prices are 
prices where an analyst believes the stock in question should trade at after or during 
estimation period (usually 12 months). While the main research question of this thesis is 
not explicitly identified in Ramnath, Rock and Shane’s taxonomy, this thesis touches on 
many relevant research topics outlined in their article. We explore not EPS estimates but 
target prices. Target prices have been systematically archived only fairly recently. The 
question of benefiting from information only available for local analysts is a question on 
the type of information that is essential for an analyst to provide more accurate esti-
mates: will quantitative financial accounting information, global public data and com-
pany information disclosed in English lead to adequate forecasts or is there relevant 
information that is only available for locals. An impact study of local and foreign ana-
lysts’ target price revisions gives insight into how efficiently and strongly markets in-
corporate information from different, possibly unequal sources. Inefficiencies in rele-
vant information diffusion or coverage decisions can be a product of irrationally prefer-
ring agents that are familiar to the foreign/local investor. Portfolio testing takes the prac-
tical point of view regarding different analyst groups – is the proposed local advantage 
advantageous enough to produce distinct investment value? 
This thesis utilizes analyst target prices to derive ex ante expected returns for the 
classic mean-variance portfolio optimization. This approach is investigated as a method 
to test overall and relative risk-adjusted target price profitability of an analyst group. It 
is generally assessed that of the three variables – variance, covariance and expected re-
turns – needed to derive classic mean-variance-efficient portfolio weights expected re-
turns are the most difficult to estimate successfully (see for example Chopra & Ziembra 
1993). Balancing a portfolio by implicit expected returns (derived from target prices) 
tilts the ex ante efficient portfolio from neutral market portfolio in the direction promot-
ed by analysts who have individual views regarding particular equities. Reviewing such 
portfolios’ risk-adjusted returns shed light to whether local and non-local groups pro-
duce relevant information to the investor or if they only add noise or are not sufficiently 
robust or if advantageous information cannot be exploited due to fees or other realistic 
constraints. These questions can be additionally framed as questions whether classic 
capital asset pricing theories need adjustment or replacement – in other words, do risk-
adjusted models or analysts produce consistently better estimates for returns. Naturally, 
the thesis refers additionally to the classic hypothesis of market efficiency that states 
that the current market prices are already fair. 
The investment value of analyst stock analyses has garnered finance research inter-
est. Womack (1996) found that analyst recommendations appeared to have market tim-
ing and stock-picking abilities. Barber et al. (2001) investigated public consensus rec-
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ommendations and formed trading strategies on best/worst analyst recommended US 
stocks. They discovered that most highly ranked stocks outperformed on average with 
annual return of 18.8%, compared to value-weighted market portfolio’s 14.5% and 
worst ranked stocks’ return of 5.78%. While these average returns seem to contradict 
the semi-strong efficiency, the researchers summarize that these excess returns would 
require timely rebalancing, turnover rates of over 400% and thus high transaction costs. 
They conclude that “[a]fter accounting for transactions costs, these active trading strate-
gies do not reliably beat a market index” (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman 
2001, 535.) Nevertheless, according to Barber et al. there is some important information 
in analysts’ recommendations and if an investor is otherwise looking to trade with cer-
tain stocks he should on average do better (worse) with stocks with more positive (nega-
tive) recommendations. The investor in question additionally needs to act fast on rec-
ommendation consensus news, which might be unrealistic, especially for retail inves-
tors. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) fortified the hypothesis that analyst recommendations 
are able to separate winners from losers with international evidence. Generally analysts 
are interpreted in the research tradition as important information diffusers in the mar-
kets, but their investment value is moderated by costs and other realistic configurations. 
This thesis expands on this theme with a more complex investing strategy and re-
fined utilization of analysts’ views expressed as target prices. Positive, neutral or nega-
tive views on securities are stated in quantitative terms, which allow putting more (less) 
weight to most highly (lowly) valued stocks in terms of expected returns to portfolio 
risk. An alternative, more approximate method would be to invest in equal weights to 
winners and to short in equal weights losers and to account for risk ex post (see for ex-
ample Huang & Mian 2009). In this thesis transaction costs are simplified and taken 
into account. Contrary to earlier testing consensus views are not taken as overall con-
sensus, but two separate consensus groups (local/foreign) are formed. These groups are 
hypothesized to have generally different resources to forecast stock returns due to the 
local advantage. 
The key concept of this thesis is the local advantage. This concept tries to capture the 
possibly statistically significant and constant difference between returns/accuracies be-
tween local and foreign agents. The concept does not imply that the possible local ad-
vantage is an advantage generated only by the favorable environment. In fact, the under-
lying causes for the favorable differences between local and non-local agents can be 
attributed to better insider information provided to locals, to better understanding of 
shared culture, to better understanding of company’s key markets, to better analyst 
prowess or just to chance – or to all of the above. Speculation on the reasons of the local 
advantage and its testing should be kept separate unless data allows further conclusions. 
Local advantage is usually tested statistically on an aggregate level and either regarding 
accuracy or profitability. A related concept is local or home bias, which is the habit of 
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preferring assets that are situated close to the investor (as reported for example by Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999)). This proximity might be cultural or geographical. The local 
bias can be a product of irrationality or rationality – an investor might just like stocks in 
her home country better or she might have an advantage in analyzing them. 
1.2 Thesis outlines 
This thesis investigates the investment value of the analyst local advantage in the Finn-
ish equity context during 2006–2014. Studies of local advantage measure the (usually 
advantageous) differences between geographically or culturally proximate and distant 
groups of financial agents, e.g. more accurate analyst estimates or higher fund returns 
for locals. This thesis sets out to link the two aspects of the local advantage. The majori-
ty of research on local analyst advantage has supported the intuitive idea that locals 
have been generally more accurate and timely in their forecasts (for example Orpurt 
2004, Malloy 2005, Bae, Stultz & Tan 2007). 
The research tradition on analysts has focused on measuring the deviations of Earn-
ings per Share -forecasts from actual reported EPS’s, which has provided sound, com-
parable and less ambiguous results than with other measures. While these results fortify 
the hypothesis that local advantage is statistically significant and measurable, they have 
left open the question of possible investment value of the local advantage. An investor 
cannot easily base her investment decisions on local analysts forecasted EPS’s for the 
next quarters as her total expected return depends additionally on the long-term devel-
opment, dividends and expectations of the stock in question. However, either analyst 
recommendations or target prices could be used in choosing stocks or roughly estimat-
ing expected returns in one’s portfolio. As buy, hold or sell recommendations only indi-
cate the general direction of the action to be taken and not return estimates in quantita-
tive terms, they leave open the question how to form efficient portfolios based on fore-
casts of analysts. This thesis aims to test if it would be possible to develop a feasible 
investment value testing method for analyst target prices. Simulated portfolios are 
formed using analyst target prices, which can be interpreted as estimates for returns for 
the holding/estimation period (not including dividends). 
Before simulating investing, we investigate differences between local and non-local 
analysts in several aspects: coverage decisions, expectations, market reactions and esti-
mation accuracy. These are studied to test the main research approach and minimize the 
possibility of discovering a profitable strategy that is borne out of luck. They additional-
ly shed light to the nature of the local advantage. Additionally, the study of these as-
pects allows explicit linking of estimation accuracy to investing success. 
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This thesis investigates these questions in the context of Finnish OMX Nordic Hel-
sinki stock market from 2006 to 2014. The Finnish stock market has been a relatively 
small market with around 100–200 stocks traded. It is culturally and geographically 
removed from the financial centers of the world with a small population with over 5 
million people speaking the Finnish language. The Finnish regulatory framework pro-
vides a safe investing environment for both local and foreign investment. The foreign 
ownership ratio (in terms of market value) in the marketplace has dropped from 70% 
around the turn of the century to under 50% in 2014. (See Figure 1) Part of this decline 
is certainly related to Nokia’s downfall. The most common foreign analyst country in 
2014 was UK with 51% and Nordic countries (mostly Sweden) with 35% of foreign 
analysts (Rautiainen 2014). The rest of foreign analyst field worked mostly in Germany 
and France. With such a culturally and geographically distant equity market, the Finnish 
local advantage could be more pronounced and possible investment value higher. It 
would be intriguing to analyze how well remote analyst majority fare against analysts in 
neighboring countries and ponder reasons for UK analysts relatively wide coverage. 
However, in this thesis foreign analysts are not classified by country. 
 
Figure 1: Listed market value in blue, foreign ownership percentage in red.  
The empiric research is divided into three sections. First section is a descriptive anal-
ysis of analyst coverage decisions, return expectations of analysts and market reactions 
to revisions. This part explores the distribution of foreign and local analysts: are these 
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groups following particular industries or certain types of stocks with different degrees 
of optimism and are the markets reacting to each groups’ revisions in a different way. 
Second part measures the historical forecast accuracy between the groups by year and 
sector. Here we mainly follow Bae, Stulz and Tan’s (2007) empirical design in regard to 
estimating forecast accuracy. In addition, recent regulatory shifts in Finland (obligatory 
IFRS accounting starting from 2005, Corporate Governance code in 2008) towards 
more disclosure allow to test if forecasts improve in accuracy when a more investor-
friendly legislation is introduced as has been elsewhere observed (for example Tan, 
Wang & Welker 2011). Third part differs from the first two. Here we form normative 
portfolios possibly in line with the results from the first two parts. Specifically, we test 
if the best/worst estimators’ portfolio and the local and non-local consensus portfolios 
perform better out of sample than a simple index fund. 
In contrast to the earlier research on the local advantage, this thesis focuses on ana-
lyst accuracy of target prices and not EPSs. Price targets attempt to capture the entirety 
of a given stock’s intrinsic value, and thus estimating price targets demand for a more 
complete and qualitative estimation than just forecasting EPSs. If this more complete 
estimation is dependent on local information, then local advantage should be more pro-
nounced than when estimating EPSs. Tests conducted in later parts of this thesis hope to 
answer some of the questions of robustness of information advantage, investment value 
of better-informed analysts and benefits of taking the estimates as consensus or individ-
ually. 
The question of investment value of the local advantage has importance in at least 
five dimensions. Firstly, the immobility of relevant information hinders globalization of 
financial markets and heightens the risks of investing in foreign assets where an outsider 
investor is facing inferior odds compared to local agents. These advantages enjoyed by 
locals could provide a rational explanation for the well-known “home bias” – the habit 
to own mostly assets from one’s own culture or country, even if this preference results 
in “suboptimal” portfolios. Secondly, one possible reason for the local advantage is the 
better disclosure of company information to local agents. This poses an ethical and ju-
ridical problem to the markets as a whole: the playing field is not even, since one group 
is supplied with better and timelier information. Thirdly, the local advantage touches on 
the question whether analysis of qualitative and culturally-bound information can con-
sistently produce better risk-adjusted returns than purely quantitative investment strate-
gies such as the analysis of financial ratios or plain passive index investing. This is 
closely related to the question of semi-strong market efficiency and to the general use-
fulness of analysts’ work for investors. Fourthly, the study of the investment value can 
shed a critical light on the composition and the dynamics of the field of analysts cover-
ing stocks in certain country. If local agents are better informed and thus consistently 
able to produce clearer estimates, then why are foreign analysts needed at all? Finally, 
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as sell-side analysts mostly produce information for retail investors, detailed examina-
tion of usefulness of target prices can benefit both clients of analysts and analysts them-
selves. 
1.3 Research questions 
The main research question of this thesis can be formulated as follows: what is the in-
vestment value of using a group of information mediators, namely local or non-local 
analysts, who are generally assumed to be in a differential forecasting position? Natural-
ly, first the assumption of the local advantage needs to be tested. The main research 
question breaks down to smaller questions that motivate research in subsequent thesis 
chapters. 
 
 What is the composition of analysts following Finnish stocks and how has it 
developed? Which industries are analyzed more/less by locals/non-locals? 
Are some industries implied to be more easily estimated from a distance? 
 How are local and non-local implied return expectations formed? Are the 
groups possibly utilizing betas or general expectations to form their target 
prices? Is there a significant constant over/under-optimism or herding? Is 
analyst opinion dispersion of either group indicative of true future volatility 
of the stock? 
 How is the stock and options markets reacting to target price revisions of both 
groups? Can either group be identified as the main source of new target price 
information? 
 Is there a significant difference between the groups in estimation accuracy not 
accounted for by other attributes? How do consensus estimates of the two 
groups succeed? Are non-locals/locals topping/bottoming the yearly 
most/least accurate analyst rankings? 
 How well would an investing strategy based on these two groups’ target pric-
es fare against an index fund and against best/worst estimators’ fund in dif-
ferent configurations? 
 
The research questions are intertwined: better investing performance should be linked to 
better estimation accuracy and market inefficiencies in incorporating information pro-
vided by analysts. 
As the empirical data spans years 2006–2014 and includes 26 847 target price revi-
sions, limitations are needed. An investor potentially faces on average over 7 revisions 
every day with the number being higher in the later years as Figure 2 suggests. Taking 
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every revision into account when balancing a portfolio would most likely result in mas-
sive transaction costs and require unrealistic abilities of the investor when judging, 
which revisions should be followed. Instead of looking at all potential Finnish equities, 
we limit the portfolio selection to the most covered, large cap stocks (constituents of the 
OMX Helsinki 25 Index) and balance the portfolio only yearly or quarterly. Most of the 
data is concentrated around the 2008–2013 period, which means the out of sample esti-
mation will cover only six years (two years are used to distinguish best and worst esti-
mators). 
 
Figure 2: Target Price Volumes by Year. 2014 was not a full year. 
1.4 Contribution, limitation and structure 
This thesis contributes to the discussions on equity analysis, portfolio selection, infor-
mation locality, return estimation, target price forecasting, active or passive investing 
and (semi-strong) market efficiency. The first two parts of the research test previous 
forecasting literature results in the Finnish context, after disclosure improvements and 
during financial booms and busts. The introduction of more encompassing and investor-
friendly target prices instead of more exact and short-term EPS forecasts provide an 
opportunity to assess the accuracy differences between locals and non-locals when 
measured with a more complete, demanding measure. The third part turns target prices 
of different groups to ex ante expected returns and uses these returns to form testable 
portfolios. This is not a novel idea (for example Brahan & Lehavy 2003, 1964), but the 
16 
approach has not been tested in Finnish portfolio selection context and using local and 
foreign analysts as estimate sources as far as the author is cognizant. 
The thesis is limited to sell-side analysts, so the full scope of agents analyzing Finn-
ish stocks is not present. The empirical data spans 8 years so survivorship bias remains 
in both stocks and analysts. Data sources and notable exclusions are investigated in 
more detail in the 3rd chapter. The viewpoint this thesis takes in the later chapters is that 
of an investor looking to invest in Finnish stocks without the means or possibilities to 
conduct her own research and with the aim of maximizing returns and minimizing vari-
ance. An example of this kind of investor could be a foreign private investor looking for 
excess returns and diversification by acquiring Finnish stocks. Her utility function is 
expected to be risk neutral. Some trading costs are modeled in the out-of-sample testing, 
but taxes are left out. Mostly the question of estimating returns, and not variance or co-
variance, is discussed. Diversification outside Finland or outside equities is not investi-
gated. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: the next chapter summarizes the theoretical 
discussion on the analysts’ role as the information mediators in the market. It then 
delves deeper into the work of analysts and focuses on recent studies on the local ad-
vantage and their research design. The chapter ends with a brief examination of portfo-
lio theory and on the subjects of risk and return. The third chapter introduces the empir-
ical data in more detail. The fourth chapter presents the methodologies and empirical 
results and elaborates on their usefulness. The fifth chapter concludes with further re-
search questions and with a meditation on the implications of the results. 
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2 ANALYSTS AND THE LOCAL ADVANTAGE 
Analysts are needed in the financial markets when information concerning securities is 
not complete for all investors. If all present and past information about all possible secu-
rities was known, investors’ asset selection problem would theoretically be reduced to 
the standard Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model (Merton 1987, 488): a 
selection between the market portfolio and a risk-free asset according to each investor’s 
risk preference. There would be no home bias and security prices would react instanta-
neously and correctly to news. 
However, real equity market environment differs from these assumptions and thus 
makes the existence of financial agents such as analysts necessary (see for example 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980)). Analysts provide possible and present investors with con-
cise information concerning securities by analyzing both the information disclosed by 
the firms and other supplementary information. Analysts are most often compensated 
either indirectly by brokers/banks or by investors buying their reports. The analyses of 
analysts are generally based on fundamental/intrinsic analysis and not on interpreting 
past price action, which is known as technical/chartist analysis. The analyst reports can 
be used to invest in securities if their estimated value differs from current market price 
and if analyses are trustworthy, but most often analysts themselves do not carry out 
these investments on behalf of their clients. This chapter further explores these different 
aspects – information costs, outputs, expected returns and relation to price formation – 
of analysts. 
2.1 Analysts in the market 
2.1.1 Analysts and information costs 
From an information economics point of view, analysts lower three types of information 
costs for investors: search and information costs, screening costs and monitoring costs. 
Simultaneously they raise transaction costs as their wages are indirectly covered by 
higher commissions and costlier investment process. Firstly, search and information 
costs are lowered as a small, specialized group of analysts provide analyses about secu-
rities in the place of every investor training herself in equity analysis, gathering infor-
mation and conducting her own research. Secondly, screening costs are lowered as ana-
lysts provide different and complementary opinions regarding stocks’ value. As insiders 
of the firm are most probably in the best information position to value the firm, rational 
outsiders have little incentive to invest in said firm – they would have a possibility to 
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buy (sell) something probably when the insiders would view the stock/bond to be over-
valued (undervalued). Information asymmetry about the security’s value could lead 
markets to collapse. Analysts ease this information asymmetry by studying the firm’s 
capabilities and providing objective, possibly contradictory opinions for the public. 
Thirdly, analysts lower monitoring costs. If the firm’s outlook starts to wither or if the 
insiders start to maximize their own wealth, analysts should be in place to warn their 
publics. The analysts keep a watch on the securities they cover so that every individual 
investor need not to. The flipside of these benefits are higher transaction fees. 
Many aspects of discussion regarding the role of the analyst can be easily understood 
from this framework. Analysts lower the information asymmetry between insiders and 
potential investors. Unsurprisingly, analysts’ accuracy has been noted to improve as 
disclosure policies improve or accounting standards consolidate (for example Tan, 
Wang & Welker 2011; Lang & Lundholm 1996; Hope 2004). Lower information 
asymmetry additionally correlates with wider analyst following. Analyst coverage is 
found to improve the liquidity and general view of the firm: Chung and Jo (1996) prove 
that analyst following “exerts a significant and positive impact on firms' market value”. 
Von Nandelstadh (2002) finds a “positive relationship between the accuracy of estima-
tion and the relative trading volume”. Roulstone (2010) confirms the positive associa-
tion between analyst coverage and liquidity. To summarize: analysts tend to cover 
stocks that have low information thresholds and that are easy to analyze. Intuitively, 
their coverage usually helps the stock to become more liquid, have a higher market val-
ue and a more accurate price. On the other hand, analyst coverage tends to focus on 
stocks already analyzed, which leaves other stocks, so called orphans, under-analyzed 
and less liquid. As these stocks might have higher possibility to be mispriced, analyzing 
them could bring profit opportunities. 
Importance of screening costs explain the weight put on the neutrality and on the 
abilities of analysts. If investors cannot trust that the analysts publish their analyses with 
ethical code of conduct and with a reasonable accuracy, their analyses in turn can be 
trusted as little as information disclosed by insiders. Academic discussion has concen-
trated on analysts’ optimism, unhealthy incentives and herding. Easterwood and Nutt 
(2002) have fortified the well-studied claim that analysts tend to respond to positive 
information with overreaction and underreact to negative information. It is left to inves-
tors to unwind too optimistic estimates of analysts, if they want to fully use latter’s 
analyses in their investment decision. Discussion regarding “firewalls” between analyst 
and underwriter departments or brokerage houses has been continuing for a long time. 
As the same agency pays analysts and is in turn compensated from successful IPO’s or 
higher market activity, there is an incentive to influence analysts’ recommendations. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) show that underwriting bias leads to poorer performance 
of affiliated analysts’ recommendations compared to recommendations from unaffiliat-
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ed analysts. Herding, the habit of imitating the forecasts of other analysts, betrays the 
implicit promise that the analysts produce their own analyses without depending on the 
work of others. Welch (2000) finds “that herding towards the consensus is less likely 
caused by fundamental information”, meaning that analysts tend to herd regardless of 
whether the consensus is forecasting returns rightly or not. To summarize, analysts are 
not able to lower screening costs if they themselves require screening. 
Jensen and Meckling (1979) discuss the issue of monitoring costs and analysts in 
their classic paper Theory of the firm. They conclude that while analysts might not be 
able to produce excess returns, as proposed before their article by Fama, the analysts 
provide essential service for the society as a whole via higher ownership claims and 
larger firm output. The stockholders reap the benefits in form of reduced costs, when 
analysts monitor the executives of the firm on their behalf. Moyer, Chatfield and Sisne-
ros (1989) confirm this theory with empirical evidence. On the other hand this role of 
monitoring can be found problematic in some cases: as analysts get their most valuable 
information from executives they can be tempted to conduct favorable analysis in ex-
change for insider information or analyst optimism is borne as a by-product of getting to 
know the executives personally. 
2.1.2 Analysts and prices 
The relation between analysts and security prices is interesting and somewhat paradoxi-
cal. Public security prices reflect present information and future expectations: if a com-
pany is on the verge of an important drug approval, its stock price will adjust by raising 
(lowering) if the public sees the approval as likely and profitable (unlikely and expecta-
tions overoptimistic). Investors cannot profit endlessly from better information regard-
ing an asset without diffusing their private views to the public market via trading and 
subsequent price adjustment. As financial markets are highly lucrative and competitive, 
the efficient market hypothesis states that on average and in the long term prices react 
fast enough that excess profit opportunities are arbitraged away. As Fama (1965) puts it, 
“[i]n an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a 
situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect 
the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and on events 
which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an 
efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good esti-
mate of its intrinsic value.” If price adjustments overreact or underreact, these errors are 
randomly and symmetrically distributed and thus do not provide systematic profit pos-
sibilities in the long run. On the other hand, analyses of analysts provide new infor-
mation or new views on old information, which can and usually do affect prices – they 
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can provide profit possibilities for their public that in turn drive prices towards their 
intrinsic value. It can be argued that analysts can aid in the efficient price setting and 
thus are necessary agents in making the markets efficient. This adjusting of market price 
towards target prices has been statistically proven by Brav and Lehavy (2003, 1963). 
Analysts able testing of semi-strong market efficiency that proposes that asset prices 
adjust efficiently to public and historical information (Fama 1970). It is generally war-
ranted that analysts should base their estimations on companies’ official information 
complemented by industry overviews, competitive comparisons and other supplemen-
tary analysis and finally offer a more fundamental view to contrast the market’s price 
fluctuations. This information is in a sense public and thus it should not consistently 
produce excess returns if markets are semi-strong efficient. Hence, analysts are suitable 
proxies for testing the general market efficiency. The existence of the local information 
advantage might pose a violation of this efficiency, if opportunities created by it are not 
exhausted by transaction costs. As will be later discussed, local agents have been this 
exceptional group that has produced excess returns in certain studies. 
The interesting question is whether price targets of analysts are more or less accurate 
than present prices, which aggregate information from a multitude of market partici-
pants. If analysts always provided markets with better estimates, the prices should in-
stantaneously change to fluctuate near these estimates and only the constantly best ana-
lysts should be rationally listened to (provided they can be identified). This is not the 
case in the actual markets: tens of analysts provide analyses for one stock and price re-
actions differ from analyst recommendations and target prices. Target prices of analysts 
are not taken as given. Additionally, for every buyer of analyst-approved stock, there 
must be a seller who thinks the stock is overvalued and (implicitly or explicitly) conse-
quently the buyer’s analysis to be misguided. 
This thesis tests this by a method promoted by Fama (1965): by comparing analyst 
“managed” portfolios’ returns with a “randomly selected” fund’s return while keeping 
the risk levels roughly equal. These active portfolios derived from analyst target prices 
implicitly claim to be more knowledgeable about the stocks in question than all other 
market participants’ views combined. Or as Fama (1965, 16) puts it: “[t]hus, additional 
fundamental analysis is of value only when the analyst has new information which was 
not fully considered in forming current market prices, or has new insights concerning 
the effects of generally available information which are not already implicit in current 
prices.” This thesis will later test whose prices are more accurate, those of the market or 
those of the analysts. 
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2.1.3 Analyst estimates, recommendations and target prices 
There are various methods to evaluate if analysts are able to fulfil the role portrayed in 
the beginning of this chapter. It must be noted, that only a small part of the work of ana-
lysts is available for researchers to review: the historical data mostly consists of EPS 
estimates, target prices, research reports and recommendations mostly from English-
speaking sell-side analysts. While these measures capture important and comparable 
parts of the outputs of analysts, it can be argued that important aspects of analysts work 
are left uncovered. Orpurt (2004, 11) lists four facets of analyst competence of which 
accuracy is only one: traditional estimation accuracy, timeliness of analyses, quality of 
reports and client communication. It should not be hastily judged that an inaccurate ana-
lyst is worthless; she can provide her clients with well-thought reports that these clients 
can interpret themselves resulting in profitable investing. It can additionally be argued 
that even inaccurate analysts can shed light to details forgotten by others or function as 
a link between accurate analysts and their clients or as a help in psychologic issues of 
investing. 
Estimates, recommendations and target prices have different functions for investors 
and analysts. Estimates, for example estimates for next quarter’s reported EPS, are the 
main measurement of analyst accuracy. Analyst compensation is often tied to EPS esti-
mation accuracy. These estimates are usually aggregated and reported by the financial 
press as a proxy for market anticipation over the company’s near future performance. 
Their value for retail investors is limited, as they provide no complete view regarding 
the stock in question. 
The function of recommendations is the opposite: recommendation distills all the in-
formation an analyst has gathered about the prospects, risks and present expectations 
concerning a particular stock to a simple recommendation: usually buy/overweight, 
sell/underweight or hold. Amateur investors can simply follow these recommendations 
without the need to deeply understand the market conditions, firm characteristics or 
valuation methods. It must be noted, that comparison of recommendations is complicat-
ed as for example acting on the basis of a buy recommendation can lead to profit, but 
this profit might be caused by luck or actually be underwhelming compared to profits 
from non-recommended assets. 
It is the view of this thesis, that target prices combine the functions of (EPS and oth-
er) estimates and recommendations. Target prices offer grounded and quantitative prices 
for investors to trade upon. Their investment value can be tested with greater degree of 
detail than recommendations. 
According to Bonini, Zanetti and Bianchini (2010), there is no quality control over 
target prices enforced by market participants. Additionally, target prices remain relative-
ly unexplored by the academia (Kerl 2011). These facts are probably derived from the 
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ambiguous nature of target price accuracy: the price in n months is not a number meas-
ured and reported by the company, but an aggregated and ambiguous estimation provid-
ed by the market participants at the end of or during the forecasting period. As stock 
valuations can possibly fluctuate far away from their “intrinsic price”, an “overoptimis-
tic” target price can seem to be accurate if the total market is also “overoptimistic”. In 
the end, no intrinsic value is ever unambiguously measured and we have to content on 
only estimations of it. Additionally, target price data is scarcer. This is due to the fact 
that major databases only started to collect target price data in the late 1990s. 
Target prices are additionally problematic as they can be interpreted in at least in two 
ways: a target price can be understood as the price the analyst believes the stock in 
question should trade at after the time period or as a price that should be attained during 
the period. Bonini, Zanetti and Bianchini (2010, 4) understand target prices in the latter 
way: “a target price is generally assumed to be a prediction that is realized within a 
specified period, not necessarily at the end of that period”. This thesis takes the other 
stance. Firstly, following latter interpretation would signify that analysts would improve 
their “accuracy” by lowering their target prices to levels that are easily attainable. Sec-
ondly, while investors would be content after investing to stocks whose target prices are 
achieved easily, they probably had not invested as much as they should have if the tar-
get price had been set higher or will sell the stock before it reaches its higher, “real” 
“intrinsic” value. Thirdly, this interpretation would make portfolio balancing and target 
price testing somewhat more complicated as target prices could not be understood as ex 
ante expected returns for a fixed period. Fourthly, this interpretation would discriminate 
estimations that are almost reached at the end of the estimation period and report them 
as missed targets. Kerl (2011, 83) shares partly this view. Fifthly, methodology for tar-
get price testing is not fully developed and latter interpretation would complicate accu-
racy measuring. However, it can be argued that the difference is not significant as if the 
target price is unbiased estimate and attained earlier during the period, the price should 
fluctuate around the price until the end of the estimation period. Different measures are 
explored in the methodology chapter. 
Empirical evidence has been discouraging for the target price accuracy. Brav and 
Lehavy (2003) documented that “on average, the one-year-ahead target price [was] 28 
percent higher than the current market price” in IT boom years of 1997–1999. These are 
relatively high expectations compared to average stock market returns which have been 
on average around 11%. However, the S&P 500 in fact did return 27% in 1998–1999 
followed by more measly 7% in 1999–2000. Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2013) find 
analyst over-optimism to result in target prices that are on average 15% over actual re-
turns. Additionally, “only 38% of target prices are met, but 64% are met at some time 
during the forecast horizon” and “[i]n sum, [their] sample analysts do exhibit some per-
sistent abilities in forecasting stock prices, but these abilities are not economically com-
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pelling”. It is no surprise that analyst optimism leads to better performance in generally 
positive bull markets, in stocks with positive momentum and in low volatility stocks. 
(Bradshaw, Brown and Huang 2013, 954) The over-optimism of target prices persuades 
to conclude that they are meant to be taken as end of the period targets – at least self-
interested analysts should drastically lower their target levels to ensure better perfor-
mance. 
Kerl (2011) reported accuracy measure of 73.64% (if measured as absolute forecast 
error this would be around 26%) in his sample regarding German markets. Accuracy 
was improved when analysts were from institutions of higher reputations, wrote encom-
passing analyses and covered larger companies. Hindrances were over-optimism and 
stock-specific risk (high B/M-ratio and volatility). Interestingly, conflicts of interest 
were estimated to be insignificant. Bilinski, Lyssimachou and Walker (2012) report a 
target price attainability ratio of 59.1% and absolute errors ranging from 37.3% to 
58.2%. Bradshaw, Huang and Tan (2012) find that developed market infrastructure dis-
ciplines analysts from issuing too optimistic price targets. They additionally study local 
analysts and interpret that information advantage can mitigate adverse effects caused by 
too much optimism. 
2.1.4 Analysts and expected returns 
The target prices estimated by analysts imply expected returns from apprecia-
tion/depreciation of the stock for the estimation period. The question whether or how 
dividends should be included is not often discussed in practice or resolved here. The 
target prices provided by analysts are not the only possible source for expected returns. 
Classical solution of the academia is the Capital Asset Pricing Model developed inde-
pendently by Lintner, Mossin, Sharpe and Treynor. Their model joins the risk-free rate 
in the economy, expected return for the market and given asset’s covariance with the 
overall market to derive market clearing expected returns and thus prices. The CAPM is 
formulated as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓),  
 
where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) is the expected return of the asset, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑖 is the covari-
ance of the asset price to market divided by the variance of market and 𝐸(𝑅𝑚) is the 
expected return of the total market. The investor is compensated only for the systematic 
risk varying with the beta, correlation with the overall return of market. Individual as-
set’s idiosyncratic risk is not compensated as it can be effectively diversified away by 
holding more assets. Generally beta and risk premium, expected return minus risk free 
(1) 
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rate, should be both positive as negative betas are rare and investors require compensa-
tion for taking risk instead of choosing a riskless option. If standard CAPM were to em-
pirically explain asset pricing, beta should be the only required coefficient to explain 
actual returns and realizations should in long term over- and undershoot the estimation 
in equal net amounts. This has not been found to be the case. Fama and French (2004) 
have concluded that at least assets’ book-to-market values and market sizes present risks 
that are on average and consistently compensated for in actualized returns. These pre-
mias should either add or lower expected returns in addition to standard CAPM’s terms. 
Comparison of expected returns derived from asset pricing models and implied re-
turns from target prices is interesting. Firstly, analysts often use academic asset pricing 
models when they conduct discounted cash flow method analysis or residual income 
model valuation, where CAPM is used to derive equity discount rate. Secondly, as most 
often risk-free rates, betas and risk premiums are positive, expected returns from asset 
pricing models should be positive. Target prices of analysts on the other hand, seem to 
exhibit more dispersion and often imply negative holding period net returns. These neg-
ative expectations might prove to be valuable warning signals, if they are found to be 
consistently reliable in distressed conditions. More detailed comparison between the 
two sources of expected returns is conducted later in this thesis. 
Target prices of analysts and asset prices implied by asset pricing models have been 
found to be related. Brav, Lehavy and Michaely (2005) discovered that analysts’ ex-
pected returns are positively correlated with beta. As CAPM is used to calculate equity 
discount factor for DCF and RIM valuations, it is unsurprising that these are linked. The 
high Book-to-Market ratio was not correlated with higher expected returns, but small 
capitalization stocks were expected to produce higher returns. These results mean that 
analysts are somewhat in line with some fundamental ideas of asset pricing models. 
How do implied return expectations of analysts differ from other market partici-
pants? Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) studied actual investor expectations from six 
data sources: the Gallup investor survey, the Graham-Harvey Chief Financial Officer 
surveys, the American Association of Individual Investors survey, the Investor Intelli-
gence survey of investment newsletters, Robert Shiller’s investor survey, and the Sur-
vey Research Center at the University of Michigan. They found that return expectations 
expressed in these sources were extrapolated from past and negatively forecasted actual 
returns. Expected returns derived from dividend price ratio, surplus consumption and 
consumption wealth ratio were negatively correlated to investor survey expectations and 
positively to actual returns. If retail investors tend to wrongly extrapolate past returns, 
perhaps target prices of analysts could provide markets with more profound and theoret-
ically justified expectations via target prices. 
Analysts generally use two types of valuation methods: multiples methods and fun-
damental valuation methods. Multiples method consists for example of multiplying the 
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expected earnings per share with suitable multiple for the sector and adjusting the price 
with proper premiums derived from company analysis. It is arguably more heuristic, 
dependent on other agents’ work and less detailed approach compared to more funda-
mental valuation method such as DCF or RIM, where analysis of suitable discount fac-
tor and forecasts of future cash flows are needed. Both valuation techniques require es-
timating EPS, which is often used as a measurement of accuracy of analysts. According 
to a research by Demirakos, Strong & Walker (2004) the former valuation method is 
used by almost all, with only half explicitly stating using a fundamental method. 
Gleason, Bruce Johnson and Li (2012) conducted an examination of inferred valuation 
method and target price accuracy and found that both forecasting EPS accurately and 
using residual income valuation produced most accurate overall results. This was in 
contrast to Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2004) who report uniform performance for all val-
uation methods. It can be argued that fundamental analysis such as DCF links target 
prices (and expected returns) to classical asset pricing and encourages original research 
instead of extrapolating past returns or deriving price targets from present asset price 
levels that could be misjudged. If this is the case, then these kinds of analysts could in 
fact function as rational counterweights to unrealistic investor expectations. 
2.2 Local information advantage 
2.2.1 Information advantage and financial agents 
So far in this chapter analysts have been treated as a homogenous group. In reality ana-
lysts have different resources, capabilities and biases resulting in heterogeneous accura-
cies. One of the underlying reasons for differences is that some analysts are geograph-
ically or culturally proximate to companies they analyze. The local advantage hypothe-
sis states that local financial agents, analysts included, have an advantage over foreign 
colleagues resulting in generally better performance. This consistent advantage might be 
due to better access to silent information, deeper cultural knowledge and/or closer ties to 
key markets most often located near the company headquarters. On the other hand, 
proximity does not automatically result in better performance as it might lead to biases 
or local financial agents might be otherwise unexperienced or unskilled. The research 
on local advantage has aspired to isolate the effect of proximity by taking other factors 
such as experience and optimism into account. 
As the local advantage is hypothesized to stem from geographical and cultural prox-
imity, its affect should be visible in all financial agents’ performance and across all se-
curities. Butler (2008) studied a large sample of municipal bank offerings in United 
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States from 1997 to 2001. He finds that “investment banks with an in-state presence 
charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields than nonlocal underwriters” (Butler 
2008, 782). According to Butler the advantage is more stated in difficult bond issues, 
meaning un-rated and risky bonds, where soft information is important and challenging 
to gather. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) confirm the local advantage in lending in 
opaque credit markets with a data set of one bank’s one branch in one year combined 
with applicant address information. They conclude that “[their] results reveal that firm–
bank distance is an excellent proxy for a lender’s informational advantage, which it uses 
to create adverse-selection problems for its nearby competitors, to carve out local cap-
tive markets, and to partially fend off competition for its core market” (Agarwal, Haus-
wald 2010, 27). Even possible hardening of soft information via technological ad-
vancement, e.g. IT systems or credit rating software, does not erase local information 
advantage as human judgement is needed and local information gathered in local level 
before systematizing and distributing it forward. 
Funds and institutional investors are financial agents that have an incentive to pro-
duce excess returns for their investors. Baik, Kang and Kim (2010) studied local ad-
vantage extensively with a sample covering institutional investors’ profitability during 
1995 to 2007. They conclude that all types of financial institutions such as mutual 
funds, investment advisors, banks and insurance companies have a significant infor-
mation advantage. This effect is most stated with local investment advisors and “more 
pronounced in firms with high information asymmetry, such as small stocks, stocks 
with high return volatility, stocks with high R&D intensity, and young stocks” (Baik, 
Kang & Kim 2010, 105). Coval and Moskowitz (2001) applied a geographic approach 
to actively managed US fund returns. They discovered that average fund manager pro-
duced 1.84% of excess risk-adjusted returns per year in local investments over passive 
benchmark portfolios. They point out that this finding is contrary to the researched un-
derperformance that most active managers’ portfolios have experienced compared to 
passive index funds. The ability to pick local securities will also result rationally in lo-
cally concentrated portfolios. The local advantage, expressed in excess returns, was 
more prominent in remote locations, with small and old funds and when the fund was in 
turn held by local investors. These kinds of funds additionally took advantage of the 
local advantage by holding high amounts of local securities. Coval and Moskowitz es-
timate local advantage to stem from the company executives and fund managers running 
in the same social circles and generally lower information gathering costs. Similarly, 
Teo (2009) reports an outperformance of 3.72% in physically present Asia-focused 
funds. 
The local advantage manifests additionally in trading. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2005) 
examined foreign and local trading success with Korean data. They hypothesized that 
the disadvantageous trading prices foreign investors experienced were a cost of optimiz-
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ing in response to worse information position. Basically, foreign traders had to chase 
intra-day momentum signals, which resulted in roundtrip (buy and sell a stock) differ-
ence of 37 basis points. Hau (2001) researched proprietary trading in 11 German blue-
chip stocks. He found that the geographic proximity resulted in only small advantage 
and mostly for high-speed traders. More significant was the cultural proximity as for-
eign traders in non-German speaking locations exhibited economically and statistically 
inferior trading profits compared to German speakers in intraday, intraweek and inter-
month profits. Austrian and Swiss traders – both countries have German speaking popu-
lations – performed also poorly, but this underperformance was not strong. Short-term 
success gained from information advantage does not necessarily guarantee long-term 
investment profits. Dvořák (2005) studied Indonesian transaction data and reached a 
balancing view that the best results were achieved when local information was com-
bined with global expertise. This was exemplified by the excess performance of local 
clients of global brokers. Clients of Indonesian brokers received better returns in short-
term as clients of global brokers succeeded in their long-term investments. When local 
clients were compared to foreign clients, the former group performed better. To con-
clude, there is a strong evidence of locals being able to leverage their better information 
to better trading or investing. 
As local institutional investors form a rarely identified better informed group of fi-
nancial agents, trading what they trade or holding what they hold should on average 
provide excess returns. Thus, the local advantage can be seen as a rational answer to 
home bias: investors should choose to invest in securities of which they have better in-
formation than others. Coval and Moskowitz (2002) investigated investment choices of 
U.S. investment managers and discovered that local managers overweighed locally 
headquartered small firms that produced nontraded goods. It can be easily interpreted 
that these kinds of lesser-known companies might be harder to analyze from a distance. 
Favoring local investments would be a rational choice, not an emotional misstep. 
Naturally, this does not necessarily hold for all investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) studied Finnish equity ownership and discovered that investors were more likely 
to hold proximate companies that communicate with the investors’ native tongue and 
share the same culture. Additionally, they discovered this effect to be muted if the in-
vestor was not sophisticated. As un-sophisticated investors generally have very little 
diversification in their portfolios and the researchers had previously concluded them to 
underperform compared to sophisticated investors, they favor the idea of irrational fa-
miliarity bias: investors choose local stocks not because they have superior information, 
but on the basis of familiarity. 
Weisbenner and Ivković (2005) reached completely opposite result: local retail in-
vestors reaped excess returns with local investments compared to non-local investments, 
even if their total diversification was low. The advantage was more pronounced with 
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non-S&P 500 stocks. This is coincident with the general hypothesis that information 
advantage stems from using lesser known, informal and soft information. The difference 
between Grinblatt and Keloharju’s proposition and Weisbenner and Ivković’s results 
might be caused by different financial markets: Finnish investors were then fairly new 
to the stock markets and very concentrated with portfolios on average with two stocks. 
It should additionally be noted that the former researchers left the actual Finnish local 
investment return comparison to the future research. 
While the local information advantage seems to be intuitive and widely accepted, it 
is not without contradiction. Otten and Bams (2007) find contrary evidence with a data 
set of UK and US mutual funds both in returns and in investment style: foreign UK mu-
tual funds also invested in smaller companies and were able to produce similar risk-
adjusted returns. Ferreira, Matos and Pereira (2010) also contest profitable local ad-
vantage in their conference paper that used a data of equity mutual funds from 29 coun-
tries in the 2000–2007 period. According to them, local advantage is exhausted by for-
eign investors’ improved access to relevant information, better skills and learning op-
portunities. The foreign advantage is more pronounced with more global money manag-
ers. However, parallel to information advantage hypothesis, “[foreign] advantage is 
lower, however, in less-developed countries country (lower GDP per capita and weak 
investor protection) or when information asymmetry is higher (small stocks, non-MSCI 
index stocks or stocks with low analyst following)” (Ferreira, Matos & Pereira 2010, 
12–13). However, these researches have yet to be included in top scholarly journals. 
One plausible explanation for better foreign investor performance is that the local in-
formation advantage is not sufficiently utilized and differences in, for example, investor 
experience and negative home biases are more significant. 
2.2.2 Recent research on local advantage of analysts 
Local investors, mutual funds and traders have provided an interesting and identifiable 
test to the market efficiency rule, which hypothesizes that no group should be consist-
ently able to produce excess returns. If superior performance of local groups stems from 
cultural and geographic proximity to their actual and possible investments, there is little 
reason to exclude analysts from the discussion. Unsurprisingly, finance research has 
been interested in abilities of local analysts to produce better forecasts or recommenda-
tions. Analysts are additionally research-friendly as a subject as sell-side analysts’ rec-
ommendations and estimations are often gathered and published. Mutual funds’ and 
traders’ investment process and estimations are on the contrary most often not dis-
closed. This difference of information availability has allowed more diverse and pro-
found research questions on the analyst local advantage. 
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Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) conducted a research with a sample of 32 countries. They 
were able to take into account variability in firm and analyst characteristics. Their re-
sults corroborate the local information advantage in EPS forecasting: “The difference in 
the average forecast error in univariate comparisons between local and foreign analysts 
corresponds to 7.8% of the average price-scaled forecast error” (Bae, Stulz & Tan 2008, 
582). From the 32 countries examined, in 26 the local advantage was positive and in 10 
significantly positive. This variability stems from different degrees of information diffu-
sion. In countries where accounting transparency and disclosure practices are influen-
tial, the local advantage is smaller. Additionally, the local advantage is smaller when 
analyzing firms that have foreign assets signaling more global and well-known firm 
characteristics. Less idiosyncratic components in returns in a market lowered the local 
advantage, lower level of earnings management abolished the local advantage altogeth-
er. One would deduce this to signify higher local advantage in financially less devel-
oped countries, but Bae, Stulz and Tan note that this is not the case. Better foreign ana-
lyst skillsets result in the local advantage roughly equal to the one in developed markets. 
Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) are able to isolate the local advantage from other factors 
and provide a plausible explanation for it. Firstly, analysts covering both local and for-
eign stocks exhibit a lower forecasting error for local stocks. In this case many other 
variables – skill, resources, etc. – remain same, while the distance to firm analyzed 
changes. Secondly, analysts in local and global brokerage houses have no significant 
difference in forecasting performance between them. This signifies that local advantage 
is not gained by relations via brokerage, but by analyst proximity. Thirdly, analysts who 
become local exhibit gains in accuracy, while analyst who move abroad do not exhibit 
losses in forecasting ability. This can be interpreted that analysts have formed a good 
understanding of the company and possibly unofficial ties with key persons that can be 
used when forecasting from distance. The level of the local advantage is already taken 
into account in the way markets have invested: the lower the advantage the higher the 
proportion of assets invested in the country by US fund managers. 
Tests of Bae, Stulz and Tan were conducted by ordinary least squared regression of 
different measures of forecast accuracy on numerous dummy and numeric variables. 
Different subsamples were additionally used for different horizons and countries. Ro-
bustness checks were conducted by adding variables and altering sample sets. These did 
not alter the fundamental results. We will conduct somewhat similarly designed albeit 
more limited tests in the later chapters of this thesis. The Finnish stocks in Bae, Stulz 
and Tan’s sample were covered by 80 foreign analysts, with 10 purely local and 10 ex-
patriate analysts. This composition is very different from the one in our sample. The 
local advantage coefficient of Finnish analysts in their research was slightly negative (-
0.078), but not statistically significant (-0.50) in 2001–2003. When compared to other 
Scandinavian countries, the results are mixed: none is significant at 0.05-level and local 
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advantage was positive for some and negative for others. As far as the author is cogni-
zant, the only other comparative study between Finnish and foreign analysts covering is 
a short comparison by Rothovius (2003). Unfortunately, he only compares all analysts’ 
performance estimating UK and Finnish stocks and not local/foreign analysts covering 
Finnish stocks. He concludes that while UK analysts are generally more accurate, this 
accuracy probably stems from easier context and more established institutions for the 
British analysts (Rothovius 2003, 114). Clearly, more contemporary tests are needed. 
Malloy (2005) investigated local advantage in the US equity context. His conclusions 
buttresses the hypothesis of the local information advantage: local analysts both esti-
mate more accurately (-2.77% as measured by PMAFE, proportional mean absolute 
forecast error) and affect security prices more strongly (statistically significant and par-
allel responses in prices in three day window) than distant analysts. Granular data sets 
allow Malloy to distinguish that “these effects are strongest in recent years [1998–
2001], for firms located in small cities and remote areas, and for analysts issuing 
downward revisions” (Malloy 2005, 35). The result of remoteness from other agents 
magnifying the local advantage is well-known and supported. The finding that local 
advantage was growing in the later period of the sample is counterintuitive: Regulation 
Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was introduced in 2000 affirming fair and equal disclosure for 
both local and distant analysts. Importance of locality for downward revisions is inter-
esting – are positive news or views more dispersed globally and negative details left for 
local levels? Additionally, local analysts did not experience underwriting bias. Malloy 
designates this to stem from the fact that local analysts seldom work in high profile in-
stitutions that have an incentive to increase investment banking business. 
The advantage of local analyst information has been documented to additionally exist 
in the Europe. Steven Orpurt (2004) conducted a series of statistical tests on the EPS 
estimations and the estimations’ timeliness of analysts in seven European countries. 
These two key variables were measured by PMAFE and leader-follower ratios. Orpurt's 
hypotheses for plausible reasons behind the perceived better performance of local ana-
lysts compared to foreign analysts range from better incentives to lower information 
gathering costs, and more adept information processing (Orpurt 2004, 2). The latter two 
are found in numerous other studies on the advantages of local analysts information and 
have intuitive explanations. 
Orpurt (2004) finds statistically significant F-statistics for the location variable of an-
alysts, confirming the main hypothesis that local analysts generally issue more accurate 
estimates, but this result is not true for all countries in the sample (Orpurt 2004, 39). 
The correlation is stronger in Holland and especially with regard to German analysts, 
who according to Orpurt benefit from more direct culture of communication (Orpurt 
2004, 40). Where all of Orpurt's statistical tests exhibit local information advantages in 
his sample, he also finds supplementary results confirming the existence of locality and 
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fragmentation of information: the most frequent non-local analysts, UK analysts, pro-
vided the least accurate estimates. (ibid.) The comparison of the timeliness of local and 
non-local analysts' estimations also reaffirms the hypothesis: local analysts tend to take 
the lead in information dissemination, i.e. announce new information, and non-locals 
tend to follow and change their opinion after the new estimations by better-informed 
local analysts (ibid). Orpurt finds these two manifestations of the information advantage 
to be related, which confirms the overall hypothesis. As he himself notes (Orpurt 2004, 
41), these results have significant implications relating to disclosure legislation and fair 
and equal access to equity information. Unfortunately, Finland is not included in Or-
purt’s sample. 
Follower analysts are not necessarily less accurate than timely analysts. Shroff, Ven-
kataraman and Xin (2014) investigated lead and follower analysts. They discovered that 
“while lead analysts provide timely information, it appears that follower analysts play a 
complementary role by providing new and more accurate information to the market”. 
This dynamic between the two groups might explain why both are needed in the market 
and why both merit price reactions. Same idea can be applied to local and foreign ana-
lysts. 
Chang (2010) studied local advantage in Taiwanese equity setting. His results differ 
in interesting aspects from those of Orpurt and of Malloy: comparison with local and 
foreign analysts produce mixed results depending on the time horizon, being long/short 
and portfolio weighting. The most interesting notion Chang discovers is that expatriates, 
analysts that have been local and moved abroad, produced the most accurate estimates 
compared to both locals and foreigners regardless of time horizon or being long/short. 
Ranking between groups was robust, reliable across numerous metrics and not caused 
by differences in analyzed stocks, coverage decisions or resources. This result implies a 
local advantage stemming from cultural proximity. Additionally, only expatriates were 
able to beat the market with statistical significance in value-weighted returns (Chang 
2010, 1101). 
This advantage was not left unnoticed by the institutional investors. By studying fund 
flows and analyst recommendations Chang is able to deduce that funds react primarily 
to expatriate views. As he puts it: “[f]oreign institutions and local mutual funds, howev-
er, do not trade on their corresponding analysts’ recommendations. Instead, they appear 
to trade on those of expatriates. Together, it seems that the best-informed party’s (expat-
riates) information is the only information that is traded, even despite in-house or sup-
porting analysts’ information. All but the best-informed analysts’ recommendations, 
then, seem irrelevant to institutional trading.” (Chang 2010, 1106) This leaves critical 
questions unanswered: if only expatriates’ recommendations were used to trade wisely, 
why are local and foreign analysts needed (other than to train analysts to expatriate)? 
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Should (retail) investors be protected from getting worse advice than is provided by the 
expatriates to the institutional investors? 
Most contradictory results on the local advantage was produced by Bacmann and 
Bolliger (2001) who studied Latin American stock markets. They found that foreign 
analyst were overrepresented in leading analysts compared to their total size. Conse-
quently, locals most often followed foreign analysts. Additionally, foreign analysts pro-
duced more accurate EPS estimates in 58% of the time. Superior performance of foreign 
analysts in all countries except Venezuela was due to better resources, skills and infor-
mation. Furthermore, Bacmann and Bolliger report a price reaction to foreign analyst 
downward revisions, but this could not be proved to be statistically significant. It must 
be noted that these results might be dated and less fitting for Finnish equity analysis. 
Equal disclosure legislation and globalization of information dissemination changes 
the analyst environment. Now it is more often enforced by law that locals and non-
locals have “relevant material information” at the same time. Local advantage should 
now stem from soft “irrelevant” information from the company and utilizing other in-
formation sources than the company. The significance of local advantage should be 
linked to proximity to unofficial information. If this soft information is gathered by uti-
lizing nearby market information and not by socializing with executives, then it should 
be applauded. 
To summarize, similarly to local mutual funds and traders from the same cultural 
context, local analysts are generally in an advantageous position to provide more timely 
and accurate estimates. Local advantage is not necessarily seized if analysts lack other 
skills or resources. This position is made more advantageous if the market is remote, 
market capitalizations small, disclosure weak and companies’ business only local. Ex-
patriates seem to leverage the benefits of global skill networks and local knowledge. 
Importantly, the local advantage is generally recognized by the markets, especially 
when leading analysts update their views downward. It is an intriguing question, wheth-
er local and/or foreign analysts’ estimates are able to genuinely add alpha, that is, excess 
risk adjusted returns. To be able to test this, relation between risk and returns must first 
be addressed. 
2.3 Risk and return 
2.3.1 Portfolio theory 
The portfolio theory has since Markowitz (1952) sought to answer how investors should 
invest in theory and in practice. Markowitz was the first to mathematically introduce an 
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investor’s decision problem: how she faces a tradeoff between a portfolio’s expected 
return and variance. An investor prefers more expected returns for a given level of ex-
pected variance or vice versa. As portfolio variance is not dependent of only of individ-
ual assets’ variances but additionally of their covariance, an investor can reap benefits 
of diversification by holding/purchasing assets that are not perfectly positively correlat-
ed. Classic portfolio theory allows derivation of investment weights that produce mean-
variance efficient portfolios if assets’ expected returns, variances and correlations are 
known and certain assumptions are met (for example investors are risk-averse and there 
are no transaction costs or taxes). The portfolio theory suggests that every investment 
should be considered not just in absolute terms but in relation to other current/possible 
investments (one of which can be a riskless asset). 
Efficient weights in a portfolio can be derived analytically if short selling is allowed. 
Let w be the vector of weights invested in different assets with variance-covariance-
matrix 𝚺 and expected means represented by vector 𝝁. 𝑟𝑓 denotes the risk-free rate. In a 
purely theoretical framework these parameters would be non-problematic and known. 
Additionally it is assumed here that the investor only faces this choice in one time unit 
and that he is fully invested (weights sum up to one). The expected return and variance 
of the portfolio can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑝
2 = 𝒘′𝚺𝒘 
𝜇𝑝 = 𝒘′𝝁 
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It can be shown in multiple ways that the optimal solution for this problem results in 







The optimal solution maximizes ex ante Sharpe ratio and is the same for all investors 
regardless of risk-preferences. 
While theoretically elegant and intuitive, mean-variance-efficient portfolios are sel-






that Markowitz’s and others’ approach is theoretical and their assumptions unrealistic. 
If for example short-selling is disallowed, as often is, the mean-variance efficient port-
folio weights have to be mainly derived by optimization algorithms. In these settings a 
computer programs solves by trial and error the weights that maximize the tradeoff be-
tween expected return over risk-free rate and expected portfolio variance subject to con-
straints chosen. 
Another practical problem is noted by Michaud (1989, 33), who states that “MV op-
timizers are, in a fundamental sense, “estimation-error maximizers””. If an investor 
could estimate the unbiased expected returns, variances and correlations, the optimal 
portfolio would provide the best results in the long run. However, as these inputs are 
estimated with (usually significant) errors, portfolio optimization algorithms produce 
investment weights that are suboptimal, sometimes unrealistic, and these in turn result 
in reported portfolio performances worse than that of an equal weighted fund. As was 
noted before, expected returns are hardest to estimate. Additionally erroneous estima-
tion of returns has the largest impact on the overall performance of a portfolio (Chopra 
& Ziembra 1993). 
Why are efficient portfolios used in the investment simulation part of this thesis, if 
their performance is generally found to be inadequate? First, approximate risk profiles 
of stocks is taken into account via historical variances and correlations. Even if these are 
not exactly accurate, they should have some influence on the simulated investment deci-
sions. Additionally, errors in variances and correlations are not as radical in conse-
quence as errors in expected returns, which are of the main interest. Second, relative 
differences between returns are taken into account. If only few excellent return stocks 
are available at the start of the investment period, then only they are chosen instead of 
investing equally in all stocks with highest target prices. Third, benchmarking against 
an index fund is possible, intuitive and straightforward. 
2.3.2 Sharpe ratio 
Comparison of raw returns is misleading and theoretically unjustified. One of the most 
fundamental insights of capital asset theory is that risk should be in long run and on 
average compensated with higher returns due to rational market participants. Thus, 
strategies providing higher returns might not be superior to others, if risks taken in the 
process are also increased. Risk is usually understood as the variance of returns. This 
variance can stem from the correlation with the market as a whole (beta), from higher 
probability to default (one explanation for the higher returns for small cap stocks anom-
aly) or simply stock-specific variance (idiosyncratic risk). While risk or uncertainty can 
be in some cases positive, it is intuitive that risk-averse investors would prefer return 
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certainty over uncertainty. The square root of variance is standard deviation, often 
called volatility in finance. Implied volatility is the volatility calculated from the stand-
ard option formulas and market prices. In this thesis volatilities refer to realized volatili-
ties, if not stated otherwise. 
A generally accepted way to quantify investment performance is reward-to-
variability ratio, introduced by Sharpe in 1966 and widely known as the Sharpe ratio 
(Sharpe 1994). This simple equation relates ex post how much returns were generated 
with a certain risk level, measured by standard deviation of returns. Intuition is sound: 
investor prefers more return and less risk, so the higher the ex post Sharpe ratio, the 
more successful the investment strategy has been.  
 





where ?̅? is the sample average return and 𝜎𝐷 is the sample standard deviation. 
The Sharpe ratio is linked to Markowitz’s mean-variance optimization. As an inves-
tor can theoretically remove nearly all idiosyncratic risk of a stock by diversifying his 
portfolio, the only rational expected return she can expect is related to market return 
over risk-free rate and to the stock’s correlation to the overall market (called beta). In 
theory and under certain assumptions, in the asset markets there is one uniform price of 
risk and a rational investor plainly chooses between how much of the optimal market 
portfolio and how much of the risk-free asset she holds. A radical conclusion for the 
investor is that everyone should hold the same, mean-variance efficient composition of 
the risky market asset and not deviate from these weights. Additionally these weights 
are hypothesized to be the current market values to total market value in the market. 
The relation between a target price and risk premiums can additionally be decom-
posed in this way, as has been done by Da and Schaumburg (2011): 
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where 𝐸𝐴(𝛼) is the expected alpha, 𝛽𝑀 is the beta of the stock and the market, 𝐸
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is expected return on the market and ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸
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𝑖=1  captures other risk premia loadings 





investment value of strategies such as using analysts target prices. There should be a 
way to separate genuine alpha from risk factors and loadings. This is problematic, as not 
all risk factors are known, measurable or quantified. Additionally, analyst estimates of 
these risk factors are not known. 
Da and Schaumburg (2011) provide one method for testing alpha. First, they sort 
TPERs by choosing stocks in the same sector. This means that the risk profiles in this 
group should be fairly similar and differences in analysts’ views could be interpreted as 
differences in estimated alphas. Second, they form portfolios where they buy (short) 
stocks in the same sector which have the (highest) lowest consensus target prices. 
Thirdly, they test how these portfolios fare against well-known factor (size, B/M, liquid-
ity) models, anomalies and price reversals. If portfolios generated more returns than 
factor models, then the exceeding part must have been alpha, excess return generated by 
not taking extra risk. These portfolios performed successfully with around 200bps 
monthly excess return in their sample, even when divided into subsamples and with 
transaction costs taken into account. This leads them to conclude that “[t]he key result 
from our analysis is that the informativeness of analysts’ target price forecasts mainly 
derives from the implied within sector/industry relative valuations and not from the lev-
el of the individual forecasts themselves. Moreover, the predictive power of target pric-
es for subsequent returns is economically and statistically significant even after explicit-
ly skipping the first week post announcement”. (Da and Schaumburg 2011, 191). Alter-
nate way is to choose stocks from the same set and test ex post Sharpe ratios compared 
to index fund performance. This is the method of this thesis. 
2.3.3 Target price dispersion and realized volatility 
While analysts themselves do not provide estimates for volatilities, they as a group pub-
licly disagree or agree on the range and probability of target prices. This is called ana-
lyst (target price) dispersion. A higher measure of dispersion means that opinions on 
future price are wider apart from each other. This is measured in Athanassakos and Ka-
limipalli (2003) by analyst estimation volatility standardized by stock price. We use the 
same measure and control for market volatility as they have. They report positive rela-
tion between present analyst EPS dispersion and future return volatility. 
Dispersion can stem from several reasons. Some of them are rational, other biased. 
Analysts can disagree due to the fact that the stock in question has several possible out-
comes that analysts deem plausible. In this case dispersion would reflect grounded and 
well-thought individual views that should be reflected in the future volatility. The stock 
price would move drastically due to intrinsic reasons. Other possible source of disper-
sion is analyst competition, where analysts issue bold predictions to stand out from the 
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crowd and generate trading volume for their brokerage houses. In this scenario disper-
sion might not reflect true volatility – intrinsic value could actually be reasonably stable 
or not that disagreeable. 
Dispersion is linked to home bias. Kilka and Weber (2000) surveyed US and German 
graduate level investment students. They discovered that when assessing local stocks 
students were more optimistic, confident and exhibited less dispersion than when ana-
lyzing foreign stocks. This was true for both Americans and Germans. Kilka and Weber 
propose this preferential treatment to be a possible explanation for under-investment in 
foreign equities. Alternate hypothesis is that these groups have different information 
sets regarding said equities. 
We hypothesize that locals as a better-informed group exhibit less dispersion and a 
measure of dispersion can predict future volatility. If foreign analysts disagree strongly, 
this could be due to reasons not motivated by profound research that is possible mostly 
for locals. Apparently, this hypothesis has not been tested before. 
2.3.4 Evaluating investing strategies 
Statistical evaluation of investing strategies is problematic. Standard hurdle rates (p val-
ue of 5%) used do not take multiple testing into account. If a large amount of random 
strategies are tested before choosing the presented strategy it becomes probable that at 
least one is deemed significant with a high probability even without actual causality. As 
successful strategies are more interesting for the public, there is an incentive to mainly 
publish research confirming investment success and statistically significant results. This 
is sometimes called data mining. 
Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2014) suggest few methods to account for multiple testing. 
One is to “haircut” Sharpe ratio by dividing required threshold by the number of tests. 
Other is to use an out-of-sample method to test the success of an investing strategy in 
two samples. We adopt the out-of-sample method. Harvey, Liu and Zhu warn that out-
of-sample tests are sometimes chosen by the researcher to buttress their hypotheses and 
their smaller sample sizes can lead to problems. 
Additionally, a contrary strategy to the one tested should provide negative results if 
the investment success/failure is driven by true causality and not luck. This is usually 
done in simulation by shorting securities with lower expectations or buying sell-
recommended stocks and comparing differences of returns. We form a portfolio from 
worst best forecasters’ estimates to test the overall idea of utilizing target prices for 
portfolio optimization and investigate accuracies in detail. 
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3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Empirical design of this thesis is three-fold. Firstly, the local advantage is examined 
from the perspective of the markets. Coverage distributions, implied expected returns, 
leader-follower ratios and market reactions are studied. Secondly, the proposed ad-
vantage of local analysts is tested via accuracy comparisons, and return and volatility 
prediction power is tested. Thirdly, tests of investment value of analysts’ target prices 
are conducted out-of-sample. The empirical test pattern is formed to answer if local ana-
lysts possess robust advantage and what kind of relative and absolute investment per-
formance their target prices imply. 
All basic test preparation and portfolio simulation were conducted with Microsoft 
Excel. Statistical tests were run in StatPlus or in EViews. The methodology and the 
construction of variables are explained below. 
Returns are calculated as logarithmic returns in market reactions but elsewhere as 
percentage returns. Mainly we refer to annualized returns. The analysts are assumed to 
be sell-side analysts unless otherwise stated. The same applies to currencies: they are 
measured in euros unless otherwise stated. In tables, red color signifies either high cor-
relations, significant coefficients or results that warrant special attention. 
3.1 Description of the data 
The empirical sample covers an interesting period for Finnish equities. It includes peri-
ods of upswings and downturns, which permits estimation comparison and portfolio 
testing in different market circumstances. Additionally, the sample covers a period after 
two important shifts in the analyst environment: obligatory IFRS accounting starting 
from 2005 and Corporate Governance code in 2008. As previously examined, these 
changes towards more equal disclosure should result in lower local information ad-
vantage and generally better estimates. 
Analyst target price data was gathered from I/B/E/S via Wharton Research Data Ser-
vices in early 2015. All stocks with country code SF were included. The timeframe in 
search was not limited. First years of the data (1999–2005) were discarded, as they un-
realistically included only a handful of target prices and few local analysts. Then stocks 
in other currencies than euro were excluded from the data. A cursory check was con-
ducted to confirm a match to the current stock market and analysts. Notable exclusions 
include at least Nordea’s, Handelsbanken’s analysts and the Valmet stock. These prepa-
rations resulted in a sample of 26 607 target prices from original set of over 33 000. 
Return, price, index, implied volatility and return data were gathered from Thompson 
Datastream and OMX NASDAQ website. Proxy for risk-free rate is derived from Ger-
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man 10 year government bond yields, gathered from FED website. Only few wrong data 
inputs (e.g. wrongly placed decimal) were found and removed. 
Division to local and non-local analysts was done by hand based on analyst firm lo-
cation. In few unclear cases, for example now-defunct banks, interpretation was based 
on analyst surnames and on the history of known branches in Finland. Analysts identi-
fied as locals accounted for 56.2% of target prices and non-locals for 43.8%. Most for-
eign analysts seemed to be located in Europe (especially Sweden) or in the US. It 
should additionally be noted that foreign banks employed a number of analysts with 
Finnish and Swedish surnames, possibly signaling use of expatriates. These were not 
examined. 
Assigning stocks to 9 sectors stems mostly from OMX Helsinki’s official categoriza-
tion. The Utilities and Oil&Gas sectors were combined as they only had 2 stocks. As the 
Finnish stock market is concentrated on the industrial sector, it is little surprise that this 
sector dominates the sample with 31.8% of target prices. The Technology and material 
sectors gathered second highest ratios with 17.6% and 14.9%. The Financials, Consum-
er services, Consumer goods and Oil, Gas & Utilities all accounted for 6–9% of the 
sample. Health care and Telecom sectors both had around 2% of the sample. Some in-
terpretation was required: 14.5% of target prices were given to companies whose sector 
was interpreted by the author using the public data of the companies. 5.9% of sample 
concerned Nokia, the former Finnish mobile giant, whose share of market value of the 
exchange ranged from 75% during the IT bubble to the present day level of 10%. To 
conclude, Finnish stock market is fairly focused on global industrial, technological and 
financial companies. OMX Helsinki 25 constituent history was gathered from Wikipe-
dia editing history. The constituent list is in Appendix I. While not encompassing, the 
data provides a rich overview on target prices for Finnish stocks. 
3.2 Methodology 
Two basic statistical tools are used throughout this thesis: linear regression and t-test for 
two means assuming unequal variances. Former is used to study independent variables 
linear correlation with dependent variables. Latter is used to compare if two samples 
have statistically significantly different means. The two are linked: linear regression 
with only one dummy variable (e.g. local is coded as 1, non-local as 0) is a comparison 
of two means with constant signifying mean of the sample and coefficient of dummy 
possible mean difference between groups. If dummy variable coefficient is not statisti-
cally different from zero, there is not a difference between the groups in the sample. 
This way of computing and presenting means comparison by regressing only on a 
dummy variable is used later. 
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In general linear regression assumes that each variable affects the dependent variable 
linearly and independently of other variables (not multi-collinear). Residuals of the line-
ar regression should be uncorrelated, normally distributed and homoscedastic (have 
same variance). Additionally, linear regression by OLS method is somewhat prone to 
extreme outliers, which can radically alter coefficients. 
These assumptions of linear regression are seldom tested or resolved in the research 
literature on analysts. Analysts play a small part in the overall market and they are as a 
group heterogeneous. Their impact is in reality limited and for example their expecta-
tions might not fit into elegant linear models. Many related variables and phenomena 
are not linear in nature or cannot be made linear by transformations. R-squared 
measures, which correspond to the percentage of variation explained by the model, are 
consequently rather modest. Adjusted R-squared values takes into account the number 
of variables used and discriminates against utilizing too many variables. It is mainly 
utilized to compare alternative models. 
These problems are negotiated in this thesis by several approaches. Multi-collinearity 
of independent variables is tested by checking correlations. As our samples tend to be 
large, collinearity should not be a problem. Large samples additionally allow to form 
subsets, which can be compared to aggregate regressions. Non-normality of residuals is 
softened by central limit theorem, which states that large sets will approximate normal 
distributions. Heteroskedasticity is taken into account by estimating linear regressions 
with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. This improves regressions but 
not radically from ordinary OLS regression, which was additionally tested but not re-
ported. The effect of outliers is limited in some regressions by winsorizing, which 
means removing certain amount of extreme values from the sample. In this thesis, the 
level is set at 1% from both ends. 
The linear model is taken in this thesis as a tool to draft and test correlations and not 
as a model to be perfected. In research papers on the subject questions of robustness, 
validity and generalizability are often addressed by using several samples, subsamples, 
variables and supplementary methods such as ranking. This multi-method approach is 
taken in subsequent sections. If the reader is more interested in the linear regression she 
is advised to refer to for example Hair (1984). 
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4 EMPIRICAL TEST DESIGNS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Coverage decisions 
4.1.1 Methodology 
The study of coverage distribution is a straightforward comparison of how much the 
actual coverage distributions in sectors differ from average distribution in total. First, 
the shares of local and non-local target prices are calculated in aggregate for each year. 
Then each year shares of local and non-local target prices in the sectors are compared to 
the aggregate balance. This will reveal which sectors are relatively more (less) followed 
by locals /non-locals. Year-to-year comparisons will allow mapping of the possible pro-
gression in sectors and possible variation in ratios. This mapping is not done meticu-
lously or statistically as the sample covers only few years. 
Two hypotheses are examined. First, remote analysts follow sectors that are easier to 
analyze from a distance. For example consumer goods with primarily Finnish markets 
could be a sector that is difficult to analyze as a foreigner. Second, improvements in 
disclosure and better access to information should smooth coverage differences result-
ing in more non-locals in sectors where locals have dominated earlier. There should be 
an increase in the ratio of foreign analysts during the sample and more interest in a larg-
er set of sectors if these improvements concern relevant information. An alternative 
explanation for coverage decisions is that foreign stocks are chosen to be analyzed de-
pending on foreign customer demand. 
4.1.2 Coverage distributions 
The examination of aggregate volumes, presented in Figure 3, of target prices leads to 
mixed conclusions. Dominance of local target prices was reversed in the crisis year 
2010. Otherwise shares of local target price volumes are distributed around 45–55%. 
The last two years of the sample exhibit higher relative levels of local volume and over-
all fewer target prices. An increase of non-local activity due to improving disclosure, 
IFRS regulation and global communication was not perceived after 2007. As data be-
fore 2007 was not complete or robust, it is not clear that this improvement was due to 
IFRS regulation. Crisis years 2008 (financial crisis) and 2011 (Eurozone trouble) are 
reflected in the sample with frequent target price revision activity. The reduction in non-




Figure 3: Aggregate Target Price volume distribution. 
A more detailed comparison across individual sectors indicates that certain sectors 
were favored or shunned by (non-)locals. Oil & Gas & Utilities and Telecom sectors 
have clearly highest shares of non-locals. Consumer goods, Health Care and Consumer 
services were on the contrary mostly covered by locals. Financials, Materials and Tech-
nology sectors were slightly more covered by foreign analysts, while Industrials were 
slightly tilted towards local analyst coverage. Progressions of coverage ratios were not 
radical. Industrials and Consumer goods were covered by more non-locals towards the 








Figure 4: Coverage ratios for each sector. 
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The interpretation of the coverage decisions is not straightforward. Oil & Gas & Util-
ities consists of state-owned electricity company Fortum and previously state-owned 
biofuel/refinery company Neste (former Neste Oil). These are both large global compa-
nies in stable industries with host of global competitors and international ownership and 
interest. It can be argued that both companies have only few distinct features that could 
hinder analyzing them from a distance. Same applies to Telecom sector that includes 
only few large cap stocks in a rather universal and defensive sector. The high share of 
non-locals covering Financials can be attributed to the fact that analysts themselves 
work in the financial sector and thus have acquired capabilities to analyze other finan-
cial firms from a far. Another explanation is that foreign investors or brokerage firms 
demand analysts to cover these kinds of stocks, even if locals have an advantage in ana-
lyzing them. 
Sectors most covered by locals share some common traits. They are more concen-
trated on the Finnish home market, Scandinavia or Russia. They are additionally mostly 
Small and Mid Cap stocks, which in general have mostly local analyst following. It can 
be argued that analyzing these stocks would require some knowledge of the aspects of 
Finnish or Russian customers’ preferences, which can be difficult to acquire from a dis-
tance. However, non-locals shares in these grew towards the end of the sample. 
4.2 Expectations 
4.2.1 Methodology 
Expected returns are future returns most likely expected to realize. These expectations 
are not deterministic but probabilistic. The expectation of a return for given stock 
should be “the best guess” for the value. The counterpart for this in the probability theo-
ry is average of sample which converges to the true mean as the sample size increases. 
If expected return estimates are unbiased, the measurement errors should net out in the 
long run. 
Price targets imply expected net returns from the depreciation/appreciation of the 
stock price. As was earlier summarized, these return expectations have been discovered 
to be generally too optimistic. This empirical part examines implied expected returns for 
each sector and regresses these returns on asset pricing models. Specifically, the test is 
similar to Brav, Lehavy and Michaely (2005) who report positive correlation between 
betas and small-cap premiums with implied expected returns. This would signify that 
analysts generally view that risks presented by beta and small cap stocks will be com-
pensated in the market by higher mean returns. These two variables accounted for 5.9% 
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(betas) and 12.2% (betas and size and risk premia) of expected return variation in their 
research. Other tested variables are past returns signaling mean-reversion as identified 
by Dorsett and Reichenstein (1995) and average expectations signaling use of multiples 
valuation. If expectations of analysts are in line with these variables, they can be inter-
preted to be transmitting theoretically sound ideas to the marketplace. Naturally, expec-
tations cannot be comprehensibly explained by asset pricing models – at least stock 
analysis should not be about just mechanical implementation of models. 
Data set used has implied expected net returns for several estimation horizons. Thus, 













This annualization method was chosen because of its likeness to cumulative returns. 
Alternative way of handling different time horizons would be to focus only on target 
prices for the 12 month horizon. Both methods are utilized in this thesis. Both target 
price and present price are additionally smoothed by taking the average of two days 
prior, current date and two days after, if available. This is done to remove high daily 
price movements from radically altering results. 
Expectations are examined first on aggregate level. We plot histograms of expected 
price changes on actual price changes and compare their mean, median, standard devia-
tion, skewness and kurtosis. To assess generalizability of results we calculate these var-
iables in each sector and compare differences to actual price changes. 
We form several variables to offer explanations for what drives expectations for each 
group. First, we calculate analyst Experience in days since the first forecast. This 
measures time spent analyzing Finnish companies. We test whether experience leads to 
pessimism/optimism. Second, we sum all target prices for given company in given year 
as variable Interest. We test whether high interest in a stock restrains expectations. 
Third, we average all expectations for the same sector in the same year to test, if ana-
lysts rely on general sector expectations in their individual target prices. This variable is 
titled Average Sector Expectations. Fourth, to test large capitalization premium we in-
clude the highest market value companies as the In Index dummy. Fifth, we assess time 
resources of an individual analyst by variable Focus, a sum of how many target prices 
an analyst announces per year. Finally, we form average Past Return by summing loga-
rithmic daily returns in the last year. If this variable is significant this would mean that 
analysts are extrapolating or countering past returns. 
Betas are computed by regressing logarithmic asset returns to market returns. Here 
we use 1-year window and OMX Helsinki 25 as proxy for the market. Betas are esti-
(9) 
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mated by regressing with OLS daily logarithmic returns for individual stock with re-







where i  refers to asset and m to market. 
Two simplifications are made: OMX 25 index is taken to represent the whole market 
and daily returns are used instead of weekly or monthly returns. This leads to lower be-
tas due to non-trading of smaller securities. Hence, average beta for all stocks is 0.78 in 
the sample. 
The linear regression is as follows for locals/non-locals: 
 
𝐸[𝑟𝑖] = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑥 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟. 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡. 𝐸𝑥𝑝. + 𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝑧 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠
+ 𝑑 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝑓 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖 
4.2.2 Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis of aggregate expectations for locals and non-locals reveals a mixed 
picture. Both groups have been overoptimistic in their mean and median. Locals have 
overshot their expectations with 8 percentage points on average, while for non-locals 
the difference is over 12 percentage points. (See Table 1) This is in contrast to Kilka 
and Weber (2000) who expect more profound optimism for the locals. Optimism in our 
sample is more restrained for both groups than in Brav and Lehavy (2003) who reported 
target prices over 28% present prices during IT boom years. Overoptimism reported 
here is closer to the Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2013) who discovered target price on 




Table 1: Statistical comparison of expectations. 
Breaking down statistical measures for each sector reveals a more complex setting. 
For locals, over-optimism is evident in 8 of 9 sectors. (See Table 2) For non-locals, 
over-optimism has been more radical in 3 of 9 sectors, while 5 of the sectors have been 
slightly too pessimistic. Is overoptimism sector-specific for non-locals? As overopti-
mism often leads to worse accuracy (see for example Kerl (2011)) it is interesting to 
reflect if local advantage could be a result of restrained optimism as proposed by Brad-
shaw, Huang and Tan (2012). 
The standard deviation of expectations has been significantly lower than realized 
volatility for locals. This observation is found in all individual sectors. Non-locals have 
reflected more closely realized volatilities, but in 7 out of 9 sectors they have exhibited 
lower dispersions than realized volatilities. This is in line with Kilka and Weber (2000) 











St. Dev 0,471 0,423
Skewness 8,004 2,246
Kurtosis 136,461 22,509




Table 2: Overall and sector-wise expectations. Red indicates undershooting. 
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Skewness, which measures asymmetry of distribution, provides additional proof of 
over-optimism. While stock returns generally are positively skewed, both groups are 
even more positively skewed than realized returns. This is true on the aggregate level 
and on 8 out of 9 sectors for both groups. On general, locals are less overly skewed: 5.2 
against realized 2.4. For non-locals: 8.0 vs. 2.2. This might be partly due to annualiza-
tion methods and the fact that non-locals have more extreme expectations that are 
heightened in higher power formulas. 
Kurtosis, which measures fat-tailedness (low value) or peakedness (high value) of 
distribution, has difficult interpretations with skewed distributions. Both groups show 
excess kurtosis (meaning over 3) on an aggregate level, with locals having smaller ex-
cess. Non-locals have more excess in 5 sectors out of 9. This supports the interpretation 
that kurtosis could be an indication of expectation herding. The sectors most covered by 
locals have no clear interpretation in relation to these results. Health Care and Consumer 
Services and Consumer Goods garnered least positively skewed expectations from non-
locals. 
Histograms of Figure 5 which plot expectations against realized returns illustrate this 
even further – actual returns have exhibited much more even and spread-out distribu-
tions than highly concentrated expectations. Additionally, left tail events are clearly 
more frequent in the actual price change data than in expectations. Clearly, all distribu-
tions are non-normal. The differences in histograms between actualized returns is due to 





Figure 5: Histograms of local/foreign expectations vs. actual price changes. 
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4.2.3 Drivers of expectation on aggregate level 
Independent variables possibly driving expectations exhibit some moderate correlations, 
which can cause multi-collinearity. Highest correlations were between In index, Interest 
(as measured by total TPS for year) and Beta variables. This was expected, as stocks in 
the index constitute the variable against which Betas are sloped and are most widely 
followed stocks. However, correlations between the variables are not higher than 0.56. 
Full correlation matrix is in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Correlation between expectation variables. 
Regression produces many statistically significant coefficients as the sample is large. 
This can be seen clearly in Table 4. Only variable Interest is deemed not significant at a 
5% confidence level. Effects of Focus, Experience and Past Returns are only marginal 
as they are measured in small magnitudes. Constant is negative but this is explained by 
average sector expectations that are often positive. If Average sector expectations is 
removed, then constant is intuitive 3.8%. Beta and In Index coefficients are in line with 
research tradition: beta is positive and near the long-term average return of the market 
and stocks of large capitalization are expected to return less than smaller stocks. Locals 
are less optimistic than non-locals as was discovered in earlier chapter, again contrary to 
Kilka and Weber (2000). 
Past returns are expected to reverse. Thus the hypothesis that analysts counter the 
habits of retail investors to extrapolate returns, as reported by Greenwood and Shleifer 
(2014), is fortified. Analyst-dependent variables Focus, Experience and Local have intu-
itive explanations. Experience (measured in days covering stocks in sample) hinders 
optimism. As an average analyst has 1665 days since his start, his expectations are 6.4% 
lower than those of a debutant. Focus measures the amount of stocks an analyst covers 
in a year. As this number rises, expectations rise as well. One interpretation is that hast-
iness leads to optimism and to pressures to “sell stocks” via uplifting analyses. 
 Adjusted R square statistic (2.9%) is lower than in Brav, Lehavy and Michael (2005) 
who report 5.9% with only beta, even with 8 variables used. This might be due to the 
fact that we haven’t winsorized (e.g. removing outlier observations) the data and have 
Correlations A B E F I L I P
AVER__SECTOR_EXPECTATION 1,00
BETA 0,23 1,00
EXPERIENCE -0,15 0,12 1,00
FOCUS 0,02 -0,05 0,14 1,00
IN_INDEX 0,10 0,54 0,03 -0,21 1,00
LOCAL -0,07 -0,19 0,07 0,36 -0,31 1,00
INTEREST 0,19 0,50 0,04 -0,24 0,56 -0,33 1,00
PAST_RETURN -0,27 0,00 0,02 -0,02 0,04 0,00 -0,12 1,00
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used data with different horizons (Value Line has 4 year target price) in need of annual-
ization. Additionally, our sample is smaller and we have estimated beta ourselves. Most 
importantly, we have included foreign analysts. 
 
 
Table 4: Linear regression for the total sample and for index stocks with 12 month hori-
zon. Red signals significant coefficient. 
If the sample is limited to only index stocks and target prices with 12 month horizon 
(i.e. no annualization needed), Local dummy is still significant but it changes to slightly 
more optimistic expectations on average (Table 4). This would be in line with Kilka and 
Weber (2000) who reported optimism for locals. The model fits the sample better with 
R-squared of 8.0%. The two other changes are lower reliance on average expectations 
and less impact of expected mean reversion. These changes compared to linear regres-
sion on total sample can be attributed to annualization creating extreme expectations or 
to the fact that on aggregate level non-index stocks that locals follow more frequently 
garnered lower expectations. 
Residual plot and normality check of residuals confirm that the regression suffers 
from heteroskedasticity and non-normality of error terms. These might be due to few 
significant outliers of great optimism/pessimism. Additionally, percentage changes are 
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not symmetrical in nature as value of a stock can only drop to zero. As analyst estimates 
are very subjective in nature, clear linear relationships would be surprising. In fact, they 
could be an indication that analysts rely on “rules of thumb” of valuation or other peo-
ple’s work instead of performing individual analyses. 
4.2.4 Drivers of expectations for local and non-local analysts 
When examined separately, locals and non-locals have different profiles. Local expecta-
tions fit the linear model clearly worse (R-squared 4.5%) than non-locals (13.1%). R-
squared for non-locals is similar to 12.2% reported by Brav, Lehavy and Michaely 
(2005). However, in their sample this model was fitted for US locals analyzing US 
stocks. Table 5 presents the linear regression results. 
 
Table 5: Linear regressions for local and non-local expectations. Red signals significant 
coefficient. 
Some interesting differences are visible. Locals tend to be less dependent on Average 
Sector Expectations, Beta and Past Returns. This could be interpreted as using less mul-
tiples valuation and less trust on mean reversion. Additionally, in harmony with the ob-
servation that the model fits foreign expectations better, this could be interpreted as us-
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 12221 after adjustments
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  
EXPERIENCE 0,000 0,025 0,000 0,000
FOCUS 0,001 0,000 0,003 0,000
IN_INDEX -0,012 0,023 -0,021 0,040
INTEREST 0,000 0,110 0,000 0,211
PASTRETURN -0,034 0,000 -0,094 0,000
AVER__SECTOR_EXPECTATION 0,362 0,000 0,990 0,000
BETA 0,053 0,000 0,160 0,000
C 0,014 0,079 -0,125 0,000
R-squared 0,045 0,131
Adjusted R-squared 0,045 0,131
Expected Annualized Change by Group
Local Non-Local
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ing more quantitative methods for forming expectations. Locals would be more inde-
pendent and possibly more qualitative in their analysis methods. An alternative explana-
tion could be different analyst traditions: CAPM could be more accepted amongst US 
analysts, as was the case in Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2005). Focus, Interest and 
Experience have generally minimal impact on expectations. Experience hinders over-
optimism. Having less time (inverse of Focus) apparently pressures foreign analysts to 
have slightly more optimistic expectations. 
Sector-wise analysis, presented in Table 6, buttresses some of these findings. Non-
Locals are more correlated with Average Sector Expectations in 7 out of 9 sectors. Of 
the remaining two, one has not significant coefficients and the second is close to even. 
This is a strong indication that generally foreign analysts’ estimates correlate more 
strongly with the consensus. Reciprocally, locals deviate more from the consensus. One 
reason for this phenomenon could be that locals have access to new information and 
non-locals have to rely more on others to form their target prices and expected returns. 
Second clear detail is the lower level of mean reversion for locals. This is evident in all 
sectors, albeit two have non-significant inputs. The most perplexing result concerns beta 
estimates, which have the highest degree of statistical non-significance in the sample (6 
out of 9). At least two explanations exist. First is that beta is already accounted for in 
other variables. Second is that statistical validation of beta (that represents the mean 
market risk premium in the long run) requires large sample sizes not present in all sec-
tors. Finally, the linear models fit foreign analysts clearly better in 5 out of 9 sectors. 
The rest 4 sectors are very close to even. 
Interestingly, the sectors least fitting the linear model are Consumer Services (5), 
Health Care (6) and Telecom (7). Telecom suffers from low sample size and from the 
fact that it is only mainly one company, Elisa. Observation on Consumer Services is in 
contradiction to the idea that foreign analysts would use Beta and Average Expectations 
to analyze culturally bound and/or distant businesses – Average Expectations are signif-
icant only for Locals. For Consumer Goods (4), these coefficients are significant. The 
clearest exception from the analysis methods proposed here is Health Care. This is in-
tuitive as drug developers are highly volatile and their value is dependent on approvals 




Table 6: Sectorwise drivers of expectations. Red = significant coefficient in upper table, 
but max.  one significant coefficient in the lower table. 
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Intercept 0,102 -0,049 0,059 -0,106 -0,018 -0,086
Aver. Sect. Exp. 0,293 0,657 0,235 1,44 0,653 1,296
Beta -0,017 0,172 0,016 0,113 0,065 0,088
Past return -0,121 -0,254 -0,035 -0,121 -0,018 -0,051
Adjusted R Square 0,109 0,139 0,021 0,094 0,059 0,056
Total number of observations 511 1153 2074 2372 5253 3112
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Intercept -0,037 -0,116 0,027 0,01 0,035 -0,053
Aver. Sect. Exp. 1,001 1,022 0,994 0,158 0,64 1,119
Beta 0,084 0,135 -0,017 -0,03 0,019 0,123
Past return 0, -0,017 -0,034 -0,122 -0,017 -0,161
Adjusted R Square 0,062 0,042 0,055 0,052 0,052 0,17
Total number of observations 1793 631 1411 587 350 242
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Intercept 0,019 0,023 0,095 0,072 0,008 -0,035
Aver. Sect. Exp. 0,391 0,864 0,372 0,673 0,62 1,014
Beta 0,026 0,004 0,02 -0,015 0,046 0,059
Past return -0,087 -0,11 -0,139 -0,156 -0,044 -0,081
Adjusted R Square 0,086 0,164 0,066 0,111 0,043 0,038








Difference (local minus non-local) 1 2 3
Aver. Sect. Exp. -0,36 -1,20 -0,64
Beta -0,19 -0,10 -0,02
Past return 0,13 0,09 0,03
Adjusted R Square -0,03 -0,07 0,00
4 5 6
Aver. Sect. Exp. 0,01 0,84 -0,48
Beta 0,10 0,01 -0,10
Past return 0,03 0,09 0,14
Adjusted R Square 0,01 0,00 -0,12
7 8 9
Aver. Sect. Exp. -0,47 -0,30 -0,39
Beta 0,02 0,03 -0,01
Past return 0,02 0,02 0,04




Tests of market reactions regarding price target announcements are event studies. The 
aim is to test whether returns in event types differ statistically from the normal mean 
returns expressed by the random walk model. These studies are often carried out as de-
scribed and summarized by MacKinlay (1997). The aim is to examine the abnormal 
activity in dates surrounding the event, so called event window. In this context this 
means studying abnormal or excess returns surrounding target price announcements. 
This can be expressed as follows for firm i and event date 𝜏: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑋𝜏) 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 is the abnormal return, either positive or negative, 𝑅𝑖𝜏 is the actual return 
and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑋𝜏) is the conditioned normal return. The event study is conducted by first 
calculating the expected normal return. This can be done either by regressing the returns 
of firm i to market returns (e.g. OMX Helsinki 25 index) and using some asset pricing 
model or using historic average returns. We average 260 days total returns prior to an-
nouncement. Then we regress the 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 for announcement date, one day and two days 
after/later to implied return for locals/non-locals. We conduct the regression only on 
stocks in index to ensure comparability. Additionally we study the whole event window 
and regress the sum of these returns to a number of variables. 
It must be noted that announcement dates leave room for interpretation. Some an-
nouncements are timed at the data at 00:00, which is unrealistic and additionally un-
clear, whether this was actually announced at t=0 or t=-1. Additionally, distant foreign 
analysts might revise their target prices after the closing of the market at the same date. 
This would mean their news can be incorporated starting from the next day. We hope to 
resolve some of this ambiguity by looking at all days in the 5-day event window and at 
the groups separately. 
The main hypothesis of market reactions to target price revisions is that revisions of 
local analysts merit stronger market reactions. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2004) report 
significant market reactions to analyst target price revisions, especially for downgrades. 
Additionally, more drastic adjustments correlate with more radical reactions in the same 
direction as the revision suggests. This would signal that markets quickly move to cap-
ture the excess return implied in the target prices of the advantageous group of analysts. 
If the whole of the expected alpha were captured in the event window, an appropriate 
(11) 
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investing strategy would likely be very active and require swift trading after revisions. 
These kinds of trading strategies are not tested. 
Target price revisions might influence option markets as well. We conduct a similar 
event study on changes in implied volatilities where available. As only the largest com-
panies have options traded, no subsamples are formed. Implied volatilities are volatili-
ties that fit the present option prices and formulas. Datastream reports them. The hy-
pothesis is that locals who are hypothesized to generally have better information should 
lower implied volatilities more when they announce new price targets. New relevant 
information decreases the level of risk (implied volatility) associated with a stock. 
Leader-follower ratios measure one lesser studied but important aspect of an ana-
lyst’s work: timeliness of information. The ratio tries to capture who the analysts are 
that introduce new ideas in the market and who in turn rely on information provided by 
leaders for their analyses. It is a crude measure and prone to chance as an insightful and 
important analyst who just happens to publish his work after others is understood to be a 
mere freeloader. For this reason, a large sample and other measures are required. 
Leader-follower ratio is constructed similarly to Orpurt (2004) who in turn relies on 











where k is the number of forecasts made by analyst a in given year, ∑ 𝑡𝑛𝑘
0𝑁
𝑛=1  is the sum 
of days between each n preceding forecasts and the kth forecast, ∑ 𝑡𝑛𝑘
1𝑁
𝑛=1  is the sum of 
days between each n following forecasts and the kth forecast. Two forecasts after and 
before the kth forecast on the same stock each year are included if they are given any 
other day than the same day. These sums are averaged each year and separated by the 
local/non-local group. After this we compare means and divide the samples into deciles 
by LFR-rank. The idea behind this model is that higher the ratio the more the analyst 
influences other analysts to update their forecasts and/or the more independent the lead-
ing analyst is. Investors should ideally focus more on the leading accurate analysts if 
they are looking to invest. 
We report leader-follower ratios for each group. The main hypothesis is that local 
analysts have higher leadership ratios. Higher leadership ratios should be linked to 
stronger market reactions if those analysts provide markets with important new infor-
mation or views regarding stocks. 
(12) 
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4.3.2 Excess stock returns around revisions 
Few preliminary conclusions can be drawn from market reactions to target price updates 
or announcements. First, excess return patterns are not distinct. Updates explain at best 
a minimal fraction of excess returns. This is not an uncommon problem: Sorescu and 
Subrahmanyam (2006) have adjusted R-squared values from 0.59% to 1.59% for the 
whole event window t-2 to t+2, the difference is due to more variables. Low p-levels 
were found in our sample additionally in dates with no clear relation to revisions. This 
is intuitive as markets react to numerous other sources of information or opinion. Sec-
ond, real event date for non-locals is apparently t=-2, but only for negative return expec-
tations. Third, excess returns were not strongly correlated to implied expected returns. 
Actually, in all cases of significance the coefficient was negative. This would indicate 
that the markets would reverse larger expected changes. This is in contrast to Brav and 
Lehavy (2003) who report a monotone progression of excess returns for larger expecta-
tions contrary to Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005). Fourth, the sign of expected implied 
return does make some difference as reported by Brav and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith, 
Mikhail and Au (2005). However, contrary to both their results in our sample it is posi-
tive target prices that merit more forceful reactions. Additionally positive expectations 
had larger adjusted R-squared statistics in our sample, which was in contrast to Sorescu 
and Subrahmanyam (2006). See Table 7 for full breakdown. 
If excess returns around revisions were taken as a total (summing excess returns from 
t=-2 to t=2) and other variables were regressed on them, the interpretation remains rela-
tively same. The model does not explain market reactions in an encompassing way – R-
squared statistic remains low at 0.2%. The Expected annualized change is not statistical-
ly significant, but positive expectations merit significantly higher excess returns than 
negative ones. However, even negative revisions are correlated with positive excess 
returns of around 1%. Apparently, sell-side analysts are able to promote asset buying. 
Markets do not react to local revisions in a significantly different manner. The method 
utilized is close to the one used by Brav and Lehavy (2003). The differences might stem 
from the fact that their sample is from the end of 1990s, during boom years. 
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Table 7: Linear regression: Revision excess returns for the event window. 
What can be interpreted from daily decomposition of excess returns for locals and 
non-locals presented in Table 8? First, local pessimistic target prices merited negative 
reactions the day before the announcement, but this was not the case in positive revi-
sions. Second, the expected annualized change was negatively correlated in all signifi-
cant cases. This would mean counter-intuitively that more pessimistic target prices 
would cause a more positive price movement and vice versa. As the expected price 
change is calculated in net percentages on average it would nullify positive excess re-
turns in date t=0 for local positive revision. Third, for locals positive news was both 
significant on announce date and showed linear dependence with the magnitude of ex-
pectation. It seems to be the most significant and coherent correlation of all event dates 
studied. Fourth, some small and non-explainable patterns were found in days prior to 
announcements. These irregularities cast some doubt on the robustness of research 
method and interpretation. As is often suggested in excess returns literature, excess re-
turns are not significantly higher than trading costs and implied return is not immediate-
ly captured. 
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 5439 after adjustments
White het. standard errors & covariance







Revision Excess  Returns
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Table 8: Daily local excess returns on event window. Red signifies statistically signifi-
cant coefficient at 0.01% level. 
4.3.3 Implied volatility changes 
The event study of implied volatility changes is more complex than stock returns for 
two reasons. Samples are smaller as options (and thus implied volatilities) are available 
for only the largest companies. Event date is not distinct as it was not clear when im-
plied volatilities are measured. Here we have used the difference between the date be-
fore and current day. Table 9 presents the results. 
 
Table 9: Changes in implied volatility during revisions. Red = statistically significant 
coefficient at the 0.05% level. 
Analyst target price announcements explain at best miniscule part of implied volatili-
ty changes. Local coefficient is not statistically significant. Statistically significant in-
Local
Variable Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos.
EXP__ANN__CHANGE -0,004 -0,006 -0,012 -0,009 -0,015 -0,011 -0,003 -0,004 -0,014 0,004
C 0,000 0,000 -0,004 0,000 -0,003 0,003 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,000
R-squared 0,000 0,002 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,006 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,001
Adjusted R-squared -0,001 0,002 0,000 0,002 0,001 0,006 -0,001 0,000 0,001 0,000
Non-Local
Variable
EXP__ANN__CHANGE -0,019 -0,001 0,005 0,000 0,004 -0,001 0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,001
C -0,002 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,001
R-squared 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000
Adjusted R-squared 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001 0,000
Market Reactions
T=-2 T=-1 T=0 T=1 T=2
Variable T=-2 T=-1 T=0 T=1 T=2
LOCAL 0,000 0,003 0,000 -0,001 0,002
C 0,002 -0,005 -0,003 -0,002 -0,003
R-squared 0,0000 0,0005 0,0000 0,0003 0,0005
Adjusted R-squared -0,0002 0,0003 -0,0001 0,0001 0,0002
Change in Implied volatility
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tercepts after announcements would lead to conclude that new information slightly low-
ers volatility, regardless of the analyst’s location. 
4.3.4 Leader-follower ratios 
Neither group emerges as a leader or follower in our sample. Mean LFR ratio for locals 
is 2.155 and for non-locals 2.19. Medians are 1.71 and 1.72. The T-test assuming heter-
oscedasticity confirms that the difference is not statistically significant (p-level 0.55). 
Compared to Orpurt (2004) who measures EPS estimates, medians reported here are 
higher (1.45 and 1.38 for the same horizon). Contrary to his study, we find no leader-
follower difference between local and non-local groups. 
When L-F ratios are ranked by decile and their constitution is investigated, same lack 
of pattern is evident in Figure 6. Non-locals had more entries in sample in all deciles, 
but ratios remained nearly constant in all deciles. Those flagged as leaders or followers 
showed no clear correlation with being local or foreign. One of the explanations for the 
discrepancy is that Orpurt measures EPS estimates that can be more easily copied from 
another analyst. Other interpretation is that EPS estimates are all updated during a cer-
tain time interval, i.e. before actual EPS updates, whereas target prices are updated ra-
ther randomly around the year. 
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Three types of estimation accuracy are discussed: exact accuracy as measured by abso-
lute differences between the expected and realized price changes, directional accuracy 
as measured by correctly estimating the sign of future return and ranking accuracy as 
measured as an ability to separate the good stocks from worse and vice versa. The latter 
is tested on the simulation part of this thesis. If not explicitly indicated otherwise, exact 
accuracy is referred. 
The estimation accuracy is examined by comparing magnitudes of error between es-
timates and realizations in groups, sectors and years in the sample. The estimation error 
magnitude can be interpreted as a return missed due to following the advice of an ana-
lyst. As discussed in the previous chapter, target prices present challenges to methodol-
ogy not encountered when analyzing EPS estimates. In addition to the question of inter-
preting target price as something to be attained during or at the end of the forecasting 
period, the concept of real price is somewhat open to question. Should the real price be 
the opening or closing price? Should dividends/splits be taken into account? Should the 
real price be exactly one year from present or should some averaging be done to smooth 
out daily fluctuations? This thesis utilizes the average price of closing prices two days 
prior to two days after plus the estimation date (total of 5 days). 
At least two approaches to measuring forecasting accuracy can be found in the litera-
ture. In the EPS forecasting literature PMAFE or proportional mean average forecast 
error is often used. It is primarily a ranking method and has no clear practical interpreta-
tion. It can be expressed in an equation, tested statistically and regressed to multiple 
variables (for example local dummy): 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑗𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )/𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑗𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
where AFE is the absolute percentage forecast error (explained below) between target 
price i and the price of the stock j, 𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐼𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is average forecast error in a given time peri-
od. Positive PMAFE means that the analyst in question was more erroneous with his 
target price than other analysts, negative signals a better than average forecasting per-
formance. (Although, sometimes these are multiplied with -1 for convenience). Accord-
ing to Clement (1999) deflating by average forecast error reduces heteroscedasticity. 
Taking the EPS PMAFE and multiplying it with the price of the stock represents the 
profit/loss taken from deviating from the analyst consensus. 









where 𝑇𝑃𝑡 is the target price of publication date and 𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑑 is the ending price in 12 
months. AM often produces a rate under 100%, representing how close the analyst es-
timates. AM is not significantly different from Mean Absolute Errors -based approach 
used with EPS estimates. Kerl does not include dividends in his measure. This measure 
can additionally be scaled with volatility. A problem with AM are negative ratios if the 
real price is sufficiently high and difficulties in using it in linear regressions. An alterna-
tive method would be to use PMAFE, which relate each forecast error to all forecast 
errors for a stock. 
We use simple Absolute Forecast Error (already used to calculate PMAFE) as used 
by Bilinski, Lyssimachou and Walker (2012) and limit our scope to well-known stocks. 
APE has few weaknesses. Estimations with low target prices and thus small denomina-
tors can have huge values if realized prices are high. Taking the absolute value addi-
tionally conceals the nature of error. It has some good qualities: proximity to formula 







where 𝐴𝑇 is the actual price on estimation date, 𝐹𝑡 is the target price. 
The accuracy testing is conducted as follows: first the average of closing prices in a 
5-day window around the forecast date is taken. Then estimation errors are calculated 
by dividing this with the target price and subtracting one. AFEs and PMAFEs are calcu-
lated. AM is discarded as it is in discord with other measures. PMAFEs limit the effect 
of outlier observations and thus produce statistical significance more often. This is why 
it is preferred. However, AFEs have more practical interpretation and allow comparison 
by year. 
We regress these measures to a number of variables: Local, Experience, Focus and 
Interest were already introduced earlier. Additionally, we form a Past Success variable 
by adding average AFE forecast errors from two earlier years for the same stock. This 
measures the ability of the analyst to correctly analyze the stock. Boldness variable is 
formed by taking the absolute value of difference between a particular expectation and 
average expectations for the year. It measures the degree of disagreement with the con-
sensus. We also include the Sign of the forecast (negative or positive return expectation) 
as a variable to measure if positive or negative expectations are more accurate. 
AFEs and PMAFEs are regressed to local dummy. Only stocks in index are included 





𝐴𝐹𝐸 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝑑 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝑓 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 
+𝑔 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + ℎ ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
Similarly: 
𝑃𝑀𝐴𝐹𝐸 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 + 𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 
+𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝑔 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 + ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
Additionally, we average local/non-local forecasts and their estimation dates to form 
consensus forecasts. This represents the aggregation of information, “wisdom of the 
crowd”. We report their success to study how information can be aggregated. 
AFE and PMAFE measure the absolute error between expected and actualized re-
turns. However, target prices might not be meant to be as exact or they might have some 
directional accuracy – i.e. the ability to predict correctly the sign of the price change. To 
investigate this phenomenon, we calculate correctly predicted price movements for each 
year and sector. Additionally, we calculate how large deviations in each sector are. If 
either local or non-local group is consistently more right than wrong (or vice versa), 
then this directional accuracy could be a signal of predictive ability. 
Accuracy tests have three main hypotheses. First, actual accuracies should be reflect-
ed on coverage decisions and market reactions investigated in earlier chapters. Second, 
errors should be concentrated on the positive side of the distribution (overoptimism). 
Third, local analysts should be more accurate. 
4.4.2 Top/bottom ratios and consensus accuracies 
An analysis of ratios of best and worst analysts does not allow exhaustive conclusions 
as Table 10 suggests. Non-locals have taken worst estimator spots slightly more. The 
best estimator ratio has experienced greater deviation. Additionally, a successful or un-
successful estimation in the last two years, measured as a sum of absolute errors, does 
not seem to predict linearly future success at the aggregate level (p-level of 44%). Mul-
tiple explanations exist: estimation accuracy might be affected by luck or missing varia-
bles or persistence at the top is lost at aggregation or the model might be inadequate. 
This is in line with the line of study that emphasizes market efficiency and difficulty of 
constant over-performance. 
The ratios here are somewhat in contrast to results reported by Mikhail, Walther and 
Willis (2004) who found persistence of forecasting ability. Brown, Gay and Turac 
(2008) on the other hand report that long-term and general abilities to be more im-
portant than specific short-term success. Our measure is firm specific and based on the 
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last two years. This issue is explored again during the portfolio simulation, where in-
vesting success clearly show persistence with the best and worst forecasters. 
 
Table 10: Ratio of locals in best/worst estimator group. 
The aggregation of information leads to better estimates. Consensus estimates per-
form consistently better than the averages of individual estimates in our sample. Both 
groups benefit greatly from averaging estimation dates and estimates. It must addition-
ally be noted that differing horizons are not taken into account here. It might be easier to 
estimate earlier target prices and the non-local average estimation date is 32 days earlier 
than local average estimation date. The non-local estimation accuracy is consequently 
probably overstated. Table 11 reports the accuracy improvements from using consensus 
estimates. 
 
Table 11: Average absolute error if consensus forecasts are utilized by sector. Red signi-
fies the lowest error. 
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The least benefit from taking averages is found in Health Care (6), Telecom (7) and 
Financials (8). Health Care estimations might require boldness, Telecom is only Elisa 
and Financials seems to generally be the sector that is the most accurately estimated. 
Reciprocally, boldness in Materials and Industrials seem to have led to large estimation 
errors that can be effectively lowered by using consensus estimates instead of individual 
analyst estimates. This view is supported by the fact that the Boldness variable (meas-
ured as difference between individual expected change and consensus expected change) 
is statistically significant at p-level of 0.01 with a coefficient of 0.53 with Absolute 
forecast error. “Standing out from the crowd” seems to lead to worse estimates on the 
aggregate level. This phenomenon might be a rational explanation for analyst herding. 
4.4.3 Linear regressions of accuracy 
The variables utilized in linear regression exhibit limited correlations as is evident in 
Table 12. The most meaningful correlation is found between Horizon and Local, where 
locals generally have longer estimation horizons and thus have larger errors. The corre-
lation between Local and Focus is negligible. We have tested the linear regression addi-
tionally with only 12 month horizon to limit its effect. 
 
Table 12: Correlations between accuracy variables. 
Linear regression of accuracy measures produces mixed results presented in Table 
13. Contrary to aggregate results in Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) we find Local dummy to 
be non-significant with AFE measure and significant with PMAFE. It should be re-
minded that PMAFE ranks analysts scaled by average error magnitude. As a measure it 
can be used to rank analysts, if they analyze stocks that have different attributes. This is 
intuitively the case here, as coverage decisions were different for both groups. Addi-
tionally, we report better model fits for AFE (0.13) than PMAFE (0.016), which is the 
opposite of Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) who report R-squared values of 0.070 and 0.010 
respectively. Otherwise, we report somewhat similar results: longer horizons correlate 
Correlations H F E B P L S
HORIZON 1,00
FOCUS 0,07 1,00
EXPERIENCE 0,08 -0,09 1,00
BOLDNESS 0,02 0,05 -0,20 1,00
PAST_SUCCESS -0,02 -0,04 -0,06 0,02 1,00
LOCAL 0,22 0,35 0,09 -0,05 -0,06 1,00
SIGN 0,06 0,17 -0,08 -0,08 0,03 0,11 1,00
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with larger errors, firm-specific experience lowers errors. Additionally, boldness corre-
lates with higher absolute errors, but this might be due to the fact stocks with high dis-
persion are generally harder to analyze. If measured with PMAFE, Boldness is not sta-
tistically significant. Analyzing more stocks (Focus) results in slightly smaller absolute 
errors, but affects negatively the analyst ranking. Past success is only significant in cer-
tain variations, but it is then negatively correlated to error magnitude. Optimism leads to 
on average 130 basis points higher absolute forecast errors, but this is only evident in 
non-winsorized samples. Additionally this might be due to the fact that majority of tar-
get prices are both inaccurate and have positive mean. 
 
Table 13: Linear regressions: AFE and PMAFE. Red signifies statistically significant 
coefficient at the 0.05% level. 
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2617 18235
Included observations: 7439/6501/6136
White het. standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  
BOLDNESS 0,74 0,00 0,76 0,00 0,67 0,00
EXPERIENCE 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
FOCUS 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00
HORIZON 0,02 0,00
LOCAL 0,02 0,34 0,02 0,29 0,02 0,28
PAST_SUCCESS 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,82 0,00 0,15
SIGN 0,14 0,00 0,13 0,00 0,02 0,23
C 0,37 0,00 0,64 0,00 0,39 0,00
R-squared 0,13 0,13 0,10
Adjusted R-squared 0,13 0,13 0,09
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2320 14021
Included observations: 6125/6004
White het. standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  
BOLDNESS -0,48 0,06 -0,09 0,62
EXPERIENCE 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
FOCUS 0,00 0,57 0,01 0,04
LOCAL -0,71 0,00 -0,39 0,00
PAST_SUCCESS -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,34
SIGN 0,18 0,41 0,24 0,01
C 3,30 0,00 2,15 0,00
R-squared 0,01 0,02
Adjusted R-squared 0,01 0,01
PMAFE
Index, 12M Index, 12M, Wins.
Index Index, 12M Index, 12M, Wins.
AFE
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Why are the PMAFE and APE measures different? One explanation is that analysts 
cover stocks with different profiles and in different sectors – locals might be on average 
analyzing stocks with higher volatility. If errors are scaled by average errors concerning 
each stock as is done with PMAFE, then locals are more accurate with a statistical sig-
nificance. Another influence on the AFE is the asymmetrical nature of the measure: for 
example if real price is near zero at the end of estimation period, the absolute forecast 
error is more pronounced. However, as histogram of Figure 7 shows, both groups have 
fairly similar and (and clearly non-normal) error distributions with small differences in 
mean (0.28 for locals vs. 0.29 for non-locals), median (both 0.06) and ratios of overly 
optimistic forecasts (55.8% vs. 55.2%). 39.1% of local errors were in absolute terms 
under 20%, for foreigners this ratio was 36.9%. 
 
Figure 7: Error distribution of locals and foreigners. 
4.4.4 Accuracy by year, sector and expectation level 
An analysis by sectors reveals interesting patterns. Local advantage is significant and 
positive only in 5 sectors. It is significant with a 5% confidence level on five sectors and 
with 1% confidence on three. These three are Consumer goods (4), Consumer services 
(5) and Materials (2). These are sectors where perhaps the knowledge of the Finnish 
consumer preferences or forest related business is essential. Two sectors first mentioned 
were additionally covered in clear excess by locals. The significant exception was found 
in the Financials (8) sector, where non-locals estimated better with a statistical signifi-
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cance. This local disadvantage could stem from a better knowledge of global financial 
trends such as central bank policy or global interest rate movements. It was reflected 
somewhat in coverage decisions: non-locals covered Financials more than locals. The 
two sectors where statistical significance was not attained were Health Care (6) and 
Technology (9) – both fairly global businesses with possibly little need to understand 
local nuances. As local advantage is not evident in all sectors, it seems plausible that it 
is not borne out of better informal and unethical ties to insiders but rather perhaps from 
the knowledge of proximate markets. Table 14 presents the PMAFE and AFE measures 
regressed to local coefficient in each year and in separate sectors. 
 
Table 14: PMAFE by sector and APE by year. Red signifies statistically significant co-
efficient at the 0.05% level. 
Analysis by estimation year reveals some interesting and perplexing trends. The local 
advantage in AFE was most prominent during only the latter part of sample, when for-
eign ownership was declining. This is in contrast to the hypothesis that shifts in regula-
tion or advances in information technology would reduce the local advantage. Alterna-
tively, the local advantage could stem from information not disclosed by companies to 
some group of analysts. During the first three years of the sample local advantage was 
non-significant. Of these years 2007 and 2008 were the start of the global financial cri-
70 
sis. The nature of the crisis – centering on global banking sector that might have been 
estimated better by non-locals – might be one explanation for the disappearance of the 
local advantage. Moreover, the same pattern is not visible in the start of the euro crisis 
in 2011 and 2012, when the local advantage clearly persisted. A persuasive preliminary 
explanation is that the crises in question were local for different groups: foreign analysts 
understood financial crisis better and locals excelled during euro-crisis. 
A comparison by year additionally illustrates one of the weaknesses of using Annual-
ized absolute forecast errors as measures of accuracy in aggregate samples. One cata-
strophic estimation year with drastic price swings and panic, 2008, raises the overall 
average difference. Nevertheless, our mean absolute error for the 12-month horizon is 
very close to the Finnish average absolute error reported by Bilinski, Lyssimachou and 
Walker (2012): 44.1% versus 48.9% for locals and 48.7% for non-locals reported here. 
The difference can be explained by different samples. 
Analysis by expectation levels provides interesting results explored in Figure 8. Ana-
lyst accuracies are evidently more accurate with target prices above present prices. On 
average both local and non-local analysts have completely missed their pessimistic ex-
pectations: on average all subsamples with negative expectations produced positive re-
turns with a growing trend: the lower the analyst expectations, the higher the positive 
returns have been. Positive expected returns on the other hand have correlated more 
consistently with positive returns both in sign of the return and on the magnitude. How-
ever, expectations were set at a too high a level. Interestingly, locals were closer to ac-
tual price changes with highly positive expectations (over 25%) and non-locals were 
closer with highly negative expectations (under -25%). However, in these levels of ex-
pectations the dispersion of errors was high. Only in stocks with high positive expected 
returns both groups additionally ranked the magnitude of returns correctly. This asym-
metry in accuracies dependent on expectation level between the groups could be one 
explanation for the high number of foreign analysts. Additionally the negative relation 
between magnitude of expectation and accuracy and improved accuracy when expecting 
positive returns provide a rational explanation for the market reactions to target price 
revisions. This result is partly in contrast to Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman 
(2001) who report that negative recommendations produced lower future returns. 
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Figure 8: Local and Non-Local Expected vs. Actual Changes. 
4.4.5 Directional accuracy 
The mismatch between expectations and realizations is not caused by outlier observa-
tions. We have tested the ability of both groups to correctly estimate signs of price 
changes in 12-month horizon for index stocks. Local analysts have estimated the sign of 
change correctly in 50.0% of all cases. For non-locals, estimation success was even 
worse with correct estimated sign in 47.4% of target prices. If all horizons were consid-
ered, the ratios were 46.0% and 45.0% respectively. These ratios should not be confused 
with randomly guessing by flipping a coin, as returns have been positive in around 75% 
of the sample. These results imply that estimation accuracy might not be accurate 
enough to estimate stock returns in a successful way. Table 15 presents a panel data on 
directional accuracy by sector and its progression during the sample. 
The ability to predict signs of price changes was dependent on sector and time. Espe-
cially the local analysts experienced large swings in their predictive ability. The largest 
differences between average ratios were in Telecommunications (7) and Health Care 
(6), which had the smallest samples. The Consumer Services (4) proved to be consist-
ently the easiest to forecast. From the basis of sign predicting ability the local advantage 
is hard to distinguish. However, in 4 out of the 5 sectors where locals had a significant 
PMAFE variable, they have a better directional accuracy. Moreover, non-locals have 
better directional accuracy in Banking, where they enjoyed a better PMAFE. Out of the 
3 PMAFE non-significant sectors 2 have fairly close average directional accuracies. It is 
clear that PMAFE and directional accuracy share some characteristics. 
72 
 













































































































































































































































































4.5 Predictive powers of target prices and analyst dispersions 
4.5.1 Methodology 








where 𝜎 is standard deviation of current target prices and 𝜇 is their average. Coefficient 
of variation is used to standardize target price dispersion to better match return standard 
deviation. It measures the dispersion of target prices. 
The regression is simple and done separately for local and non-local groups. Only 
stocks in OMX Helsinki index are included and no sector/year differences are investi-
gated. Overall stock market volatility is deduced from individual volatilities. The re-
gression is: 
 
𝜎𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝑚 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑥 ∗  𝑐𝑣 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
The main hypothesis is that coefficient of variation has predictive power only for locals. 
Another way of looking at the estimation accuracies is to regress expected price 
changes to actual price changes and compare this model to other estimation models such 
as beta or past returns. As it was earlier seen, some of these ideas of market premium or 
mean reversion were included with different degrees in analyst expectations. Predictive 
powers of the expected price changes from local and non-local target prices were com-
pared to predictive powers of average expectations, betas and past returns. This was 
done by forming linear regressions on future price changes on each variable.  
4.5.2 Analyst dispersion and future volatility 
Results from linear regression indicate strong correlation between target price disper-
sion and future volatility, even if all assumptions of the linear model are not met. Table 
16 presents the results with and without including the market volatility variable. Coeffi-
cients of covariance (CoV) exhibit statistically significant and strong correlations with 
future volatilities. Additionally, both groups have high R-squared ratios. 
Coefficient for CoV remains meaningful even if market volatility is taken into ac-




(they report 13.2% with a full model) adjusted R-squared statistics and very different 
coefficients. This might be due to variable transformation, measuring volatility on dif-
ferent basis or slightly different measures of dispersion. To conclude, the non-local dis-
persion has a slightly stronger and statistically significant correlation with future volatil-
ity, which contrasts the proposed idea of local advantage – that differences in local 
opinion reflect more profound and actual uncertainty. Both groups tend to have not suf-
ficiently dispersed views on possible price changes if market volatility is taken into ac-
count. 
 
Table 16: Predictive power of analyst dispersions. All coefficients are significant. 
4.5.3 Linear predictive power 
Linear regression on different estimations on actual price changes provides mixed, ex-
pected and coherent results. Table 17 presents overall low predictive powers. It appears 
that all expectations from non-local target prices, betas, past returns and average expec-
tations have significant but mostly negligible coefficients on future price changes. The 
problem is that for all these coefficients except beta are negative signaling that actual 
prices have been correlating negatively and overall adjusted R-squared values have been 
low. Price changes have been unpredictable and unpleasantly surprising in our sample. 
Apparently a better estimation method would have been to reverse average expectations 
and to use them. To conclude, a linear prediction of future price changes is not feasible 
by target prices or by beta or by looking at past returns. This is in line with earlier re-
search buttressing the market efficiency. 
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Table 17: Linear regressions of different variables to actual price changes. Red signifies 
statistically significant coefficient at the 0.05% level. 
4.6 Investment value 
4.6.1 Methodology 
Out-of-sample portfolio testing is conducted to test the investment value of analyst tar-
get prices. In other words: are target prices informative enough to add value or are in-
vestors better off by taking market prices as fair? This is additionally a test of a semi-
strong efficiency in the Fama sense. 
Out-of-sample testing consists of estimating relevant information in a sample and 
testing these estimations in a new sample. In this thesis we form portfolios partly based 
on the estimation performance during the last 2 years and partly on the analyst location 























os during the latter part of the sample. This testing is conducted to assess the overall 
feasibility of using analyst target prices, performances during different economic times, 
robustness and importance of transaction costs. Additionally it must be noted that the 
relation between accuracy measures and investment success/failure is clearly not linear-
ly testable. The analysis is limited to Finnish stocks included in OMX Helsinki 25 in-
dex. This means dropping out Nordea and Telia, which are Finnish companies located 
in Sweden and other companies whose data was not available. 
How is a portfolio formed from target prices? Several solutions are available. Da and 
Schaumburg (2011) and Da, Chen and Schaumburg (2015) implement a strategy where 
stocks are sorted according to target price ratios. Stocks with the highest expected re-
turns are bought long, and stocks with the lowest expected returns are sold short. This 
balancing is done in each sector and is equal-weighted. As stocks are selected from the 
same sector it can be argued they share approximately the same risk-level. Returns re-
lated to other risk factors are tested ex post. While this has been proved in the aforemen-
tioned researches as profitable, it does not capture the exact nature of individual target 
prices. Target price information is taken as relative, not absolute. If a stock has superb 
implied return it is given the same weight as if it had just an excess return in the top 
10%. This renders the approach somewhat similar to forming portfolios on recommen-
dations. Alternative and more profitable method is examined in Huang, Mian and San-
karaguruswamy (2009) who combine recommendation and target price data from revi-
sions. Their approach simulates trading on updates of consensus information. This the-
sis seeks to test the investment performance of using exact target prices, whether the 
results are good or disappointing. Thus, an alternative approach is employed. 
We construct ex ante efficient portfolios with implied appreciation returns derived 
from target prices. There are several advantages in this approach: exact nature of the 
target prices is taken into account, risk taking is addressed and the available target pric-
es are utilized in relation to one another. Comparisons to passive indexing are addition-
ally simple and intuitive. Disadvantages include: the need for large sets of expectations, 
possibly unrealistic weights and the limitation of only testing target prices of groups. 
Three inputs are needed in portfolio optimization. The mean vector is derived from 
target prices, 𝑟𝑓 is taken from German 10 year bond yields, which have been graded 
AAA during the sample. The only remaining input needed is the variance-covariance 
matrix. In the simulation, estimation for future variance-covariance matrix is derived 
from the preceding year and updated yearly. This coincides with the fact that analysts 
generally do not estimate variances or co-variances. Even if variance-covariance matrix 
is estimated sub-optimally, differences in performance between the tested portfolios 
should be dependent on return estimations as all portfolios share all other inputs. 
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4.6.2 Test configurations 
Several investing strategies are tested to estimate the effects of constraints, horizons and 
target price sample sizes on investment value. The first two simulations are less realistic 
as they simplify both target prices and holding periods as whole years. This simplifica-
tion is needed to include best and worst estimators’ performances. The last two simula-
tions use quarterly data and omit the best and worst estimators as they do not revise tar-
get prices sufficiently often. 
In the first two simulations four portfolios are simulated by forming them with and 
without allocation limits. The first portfolio is formed by using target prices of analysts 
who were most accurate in the latest 2 years for each of the constituents of OMX Hel-
sinki 25 available. The estimation window is moved forward every year to include the 
latest 2 years. This tests the possibility of finding consistently superior analysts in the 
market and if these analysts can produce excess returns with yearly rebalancing. This 
portfolio is named “Best” for brevity’s sake. Second portfolio is produced by using con-
sensus target prices of local analysts for each stock. This is done by averaging all local 
target prices for the year. This portfolio is named “Local”. Third portfolio is based on 
non-local target prices in the same manner and named “Non-Local”. Fourth portfolio is 
“Worst” and it is formed as an opposite for “Best” – utilizing return estimates from the 
analysts that have been most inaccurate during the latest 2 years. Hypotheses are that 
“Local” should outperform “Non-Local” and that “Best” should not constantly outper-
form the market, possibly due to trading costs. “Worst” should underperform. First sim-
ulation introduces a rule that a weight of a stock cannot exceed 10% in absolute terms. 
Short selling is still allowed. This simulation aims to use the same weight restriction as 
the passive index while allowing inclusion of negative views via short selling. Second 
simulation allows any weights. This is a more unrealistic simulation. The aim is to test 
the exact consequences of taking average expected returns fully into account, no matter 
how unrealistic they might be. Unrealistically, all stocks are held from the start of the 
period to the end and average consensus estimates for the year are taken to represent the 
expected annual return. 
Two other simulations were conducted to test more active, realistic portfolio man-
agement for local and non-local analyst group. No short selling was allowed. In the first 
one, target prices are collected quarterly, implied returns are averaged for each stock 
and an efficient portfolio is formed on their basis at the start of the next quarter. This 
portfolio is held to the end of the target price horizon, i.e. 12 months or 4 quarters. As 
not all stocks have new quarterly target prices, these expected returns are filled in as 
averages of other expected returns. The last simulation is otherwise similar but it takes 
into account the new information available and updates the local and non-local portfoli-
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os every quarter with new stocks. We compare both simulations’ returns and Sharpe 
ratios to an index fund and to a portfolio with constant estimates for each stock. 
Constant outperformance of any portfolio in any simulation would be a violation of 
the efficient market hypothesis. Testing consensus portfolios against a team of 
best/worst analysts sheds light to the debate whether aggregation of different views re-
sults in better overall information and consequently performance. Portfolios are bal-
anced and performance (Sharpe ratios and ranks) calculated by using Total Return time 
series calculated by Datastream. These include dividends and other returns not explicitly 
estimated. Forecasts with 12 month horizon are preferred when available. 
We calculate realized returns, Sharpe ratios and return ranks for each year. Three 
types of accuracy are examined in the end of the chapter: absolute differences between 
expected and actualized returns, ratios of correctly estimated signs of returns and abso-
lute average differences between expected ranks of returns from randomly estimated 
ranks. These measures endeavor to characterize analysts’ abilities to correctly forecast 
exact returns, directions of returns and to rank future returns. Ranking accuracy was 
tested by calculating the absolute difference between proposed rank and realized rank. 
These were averaged each year for each portfolio and average random absolute differ-
ence (7 for 21 stocks) was deduced. If an analyst portfolio was able to consistently rank 
returns better, this difference would be consistently negative. 
OMX Helsinki 25 passive index was selected for benchmark. This selection is moti-
vated not only by just the general custom of taking a broad passive index fund as the 
benchmark, but also by theory. Fama (1970, 410) states, “The norm must represent the 
results of an investment policy based on the assumption that prices fully reflect all 
available information. And if one believes that investors are generally risk averse and so 
on average must be compensated for any risks undertaken, then one has the problem of 
finding appropriate definitions of risk and evaluating each fund relative to a norm with 
its chosen level of risk.” Investing in a broad passive index means taking the current 
prices to accurately reflect return and risk levels of securities. The remaining question is 
whether an index fund and portfolios formed share the same risk level. This is addressed 
by limiting the selection to approximately same 25 stocks that form the OMX Helsinki 
25 index. Additionally, these stocks do not capture the small cap stock premium, as they 
are the largest stocks in Finland. The selection is also limited by the analyst coverage as 
only the largest capitalization stocks are analyzed outside Finland. 
As expected returns and the covariance-matrix change continuously, theoretically a 
portfolio manager would be required to constantly trade. After price target revisions she 
would instantaneously internalize information in her portfolio and probably capture 
some of the excess profits documented by researchers without affecting equity prices. 
Additionally, she would have uninterrupted access to all relevant target price updates, 
market prices and have full knowledge of the history of target prices and their accuracy. 
79 
Clearly, some of these requirements would require and result in unrealistic behavior. 
Additionally, consensus target prices have no exact estimation date and are so scarce for 
certain stocks that portfolio optimization would be difficult. This is why portfolios are 
updated only at the start of each period. 
A number of simplifying assumptions are utilized. First, transaction costs are as-
sumed to be constantly 0.2% of the trade volume. This is the highest actual present day 
transaction cost for retail investors. No other costs are modeled. This is a somewhat 
realistic assumption as having a brokerage account and receiving analyst updates is 
nowadays almost costless. In total, importance of costs when investing once a year is 
negligible. Taxes are not included as they would be cumbersome to trace and model 
from total return data. Additionally, tax benefits would complicate the portfolio optimi-
zation further. It is acknowledged that taxes in actuality hinder active portfolios as they 
receive yearly dividends taxed at 21%, which need to be reinvested causing trading 
costs. Additionally, active traders are able to write off losses in a 5-year period after the 
year losses were incurred. Index funds on the other hand pay capital taxes at the end of 
the holding period with no extra transaction costs. 
It is assumed that active portfolios do not affect prices with their trading and always 
get the full investment at a given price. This is a sensible assumption as the stocks in 
question are mostly the highest capitalization stocks and generally exhibit good liquidi-
ty. The simulated portfolio manager can go short with no extra costs. Stocks can be pur-
chased/sold short in any number, not only in integer amounts. These are unrealistic as-
sumptions, but needed to keep the simulation simple. Finally, the investor is risk-neutral 
and she has no other income during the period to invest. 
Results from out-of-sample section should converge with results from earlier sec-
tions. Most accurate analysts should produce highest risk-adjusted returns. Possible un-
der-performance in leadership-follower ratios and accuracies followed by out-
performance in investing simulation would raise questions on the simulation methodol-
ogy, sample size and the role of randomness. 
4.6.3 Year to year simulations 
Few preliminary notes on portfolio simulation results: the sample included drastic mar-
ket movements and the start year of simulation (Q1 2009) happened to coincide almost 
exactly with the market bottom. These result in lucrative total returns for active portfo-
lios during the first years. 
Predicted and actualized return series for simulation with and without the 10% max-
imum weigh constraint are plotted in Figure 9. Average accuracies and performance 
measures are presented in Table 18. Placing a realistic 10% constraint improved both 
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directional and absolute accuracy for all portfolios compared to ratios reported earlier. 
Non-local consensus return estimates were on average most precise when measured as a 
simple absolute difference with the 10% constraint. Local estimates were the second 
most accurate. Without the weight constraint these roles were reversed. Using a larger 
sample of target prices resulted in more consistently better accuracy as indicated by 
lower accuracy ranks for Local and Non-Local portfolio. This was in line with im-
provements of consensus accuracies in earlier chapters. The Worst estimator portfolio 
suffered from clearest deviations from, usually very optimistic, expectations. The port-
folio was ranked as last in all years but one, whereas the Best portfolio was on average 
ranked behind Local. These observations reinforce the hypotheses that analyst precision 
persists in groups. However, first year of the sample completely reversed the successes 
of Best and Worst in weight constrained simulation as stocks enjoyed a significant re-
bound. Additionally, only the Best portfolio ranked returns better than a random rank 









Table 18: Year to year portfolio average performance measures. Sharpe ratios were not 
statistically higher than index fund Sharpe ratios. 
The estimation success correlates only partly with following investment success as is 
evident in Table 18. The clearest exception is with accurate Local and inaccurate Non-
Local portfolios. Active portfolios forecasted unrealistically high returns and received 
somewhat good returns. However, most of these incurred at the start of the simulation 
and with adventurous risk taking. Consequently none of the portfolios produced statisti-
cally significant excess returns. The Worst portfolio was the bottom of the four in all 
subsamples in both Sharpe ratios and in returns. These would indicate that the historic 
estimation accuracy could be linked to investment success, at least with the worst and 
best estimators. Nevertheless, it is not clear which measure of accuracy should be used 
as a proxy for future investment success. 
Constraining weights to 10% was hypothesized to moderate the erroneous expecta-
tions. This was true for all portfolios barring Non-Local, which experienced improve-
ment in performance. The unconstrained simulated portfolios were overall very far from 
realistic. Local remained most realistic and sensible. On average it was invested 4.25-
times the starting value each year. Non-Local was invested on average 6.40-times, Best 
7.82-times and Worst 8.63-times. For example, in one year, Worst had sold other stocks 
Average Best Worst Local Non-Local Index
Returns 28,92 % 12,99 % 23,75 % 23,02 % 20,43 %
Return Rank 2,00 4,00 3,50 3,17 2,33
Sharpe Ratio 0,96 0,43 0,79 0,80 0,875
Sharpe Rank 2,17 4,00 3,17 3,50 2,167
Absolute Acc. 0,29 0,31 0,26 0,24
Accuracy Rank 2,33 3,50 2,17 2,00
Directional Acc. 63 % 53 % 59 % 59 %
Year to Year Portfolio Performance (10% Constraint)
Average Best Worst Local Non-Local Index
Returns 92,68 % 44,19 % 82,40 % 126,45 % 20,43 %
Return Rank 3,00 3,50 3,00 2,67 2,83
Sharpe Ratio 0,69 0,14 0,67 0,98 0,875
Sharpe Rank 2,50 3,67 3,33 3,00 2,500
Absolute Acc. 0,64 1,24 0,74 0,84
Accuracy Rank 2,5 3,67 1,67 2,17
Directional Acc. 54 % 45 % 57 % 53 %
Ranking Acc. -0,35 0,79 0,11 0,25
Year to Year Portfolio Performance (No Constraint)
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short in such amounts that it could go long 279% in another stock. Massive shorting 
was correlated with bold views and consequently large errors and volatilities. Short 
sales are in actuality restricted and costly. Amounts of risks required in this types of 
portfolios are not welcomed in realistic investing. Clearly, this simulation is mostly the-
oretical. Surprisingly, large risk taking and low directional accuracies did not result in 
any large losses of capital. 
Results concerning Local and Non-Local portfolios complicate the local advantage 
hypothesis. They both produce fairly similar results. Small local underperformance is in 
contrast to Kalev, Nguyen and Oh (2008) who report that, barring Nokia, Finnish local 
investors produced better returns during 1999–2004. In addition to different sample 
years, we focus on theoretical returns and not actual profits, and on investing and not on 
trading. 
As portfolios are balanced only yearly, costs play a limited part. In Figure 10 they 
have been modeled by subtracting twice 0.20% of current value each year representing 
selling all stocks and buying new ones. For first and last year, this was done only once. 
Importantly, taxes are not taken into account and frequent short selling is unrealistically 
done at the same commission fee structure as long selling. If a more realistic approach 
was taken into account, passive indexing would likely surpass Non-Local portfolio. 
Overall Sharpe ratios were below one, signaling average performance. 
 
 
Figure 10: Value progression. 10% constraint. 
Conclusions of year to year investing simulations are interesting yet puzzling. First, 
the analyst target prices seem to be able to estimate accurately enough to produce on 
average appealing returns regardless of over-optimism, large absolute errors and ques-
tionable directional accuracy. However, this is achieved with a higher risk and not with 
a statistical significance. Second, this ability might be mainly linked to recoveries from 
crisis years: the speedy recovery in 2009 and after the blossoming of the euro-crisis in 
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2011. Third, high raw returns are attainable for worse estimators and low Sharpe ratio 
strategies. Even with on average estimating signs of returns wrong, a portfolio can pre-
sent positive “excess” returns for investors. Fourth, the local advantage shows signs of 
sector-specificity and it seems to be again more dependent on proximity to markets than 
with proximity with headquarters. Fifth, investment success exhibit some signs of per-
sistence in both ends of the spectrum. 
4.6.4 One year buy and hold and quarterly updated simulations 
In these simulations portfolios were formed at the turns of each quarter and held for the 
whole year or until the next quarter. No short sales were allowed. Thus these simulation 
reflects most accurately and realistically the annual investment value of local and non-
local buy and hold and constantly updated portfolios. As no short-selling was allowed, 
this simulation mostly tested the analyst groups’ ability to “pick winners” each quarter. 
In contrast to the year to year portfolios, the sample of target prices is smaller (ruling 
out including Best and Worst portfolios) and investment results sample larger allowing 
better conclusions. As expected the price swings of the start year influence the overall 
returns. 
The returns from these portfolios and from the index fund are plotted in Figure 11. 
Quarterly updated portfolio profits are not annualized. A more thorough decomposition 
of returns is in Table 19. Local buy and hold portfolios performed consistently better 
than foreign portfolios of the same kind (locals had excess returns compared to non-
local portfolios with p-level of 0.054 and higher Sharpe ratios with 0.054). Same pattern 
was visible for the quarterly updated portfolios (with p-level 0.143 for excess returns 
and 0.056 for higher Sharpe ratios). This outperformance manifested in aggregate aver-
age returns, median returns, rankings of returns and in the Sharpe ratios and in a more 
favorable return range. The dominances of local buy and hold and quarterly updated 
portfolios persisted fairly strongly if sample was divided to four quarters. This overper-
formance was not caused by better directional forecasting ability as both portfolios in-
vested in stocks with positive returns with approximately the same level of directional 
accuracy. However, this directional accuracy was divided so that locals were more accu-
rate than non-locals in Q1 and Q2 and vice versa in Q3 and Q4. Forcing no short sales 









Table 19: Performance of one year buy and hold portfolios. 
Average Returns / Year Local Non-Local Index
Q1 20,5 % 5,2 % 16,1 %
Q2 2,3 % 5,6 % 13,2 %
Q3 12,0 % 11,9 % 14,1 %
Q4 35,2 % 12,6 % 21,2 %
Average 17,5 % 8,8 % 16,1 %
Median 20,1 % 3,3 % 20,8 %
Min -51,9 % -76,1 % -47,5 %
Max 154,7 % 92,1 % 90,1 %
Aver. Ret. Rank 2 2,33 1,67





Average Sharpe 0,64 0,37 0,79
Aver. Direct. Acc / Year
Q1 58,8 % 57,5 %
Q2 59,4 % 59,8 %
Q3 60,6 % 73,3 %
Q4 65,6 % 67,7 %
Buy and Hold Portfolio Returns
Average Returns / Quarter Local Non-Local Index
Q1 -1,9 % -2,4 % -4,2 %
Q2 3,6 % 2,9 % 6,0 %
Q3 3,2 % -0,8 % 2,8 %
Q4 8,3 % 3,9 % 5,9 %
Average 3,3 % 0,9 % 2,6 %
Median 3,0 % -0,5 % 4,2 %
Min -26,7 % -34,8 % -21,9 %
Max 36,3 % 27,6 % 23,8 %
Aver. Ret. Rank 1,79 2,25 1,96





Average Sharpe 0,06 0,02 0,42
Aver. Direct. Acc / Quarter
Q1 35,8 % 42,1 %
Q2 60,0 % 61,4 %
Q3 56,0 % 64,8 %
Q4 69,1 % 65,0 %
Quarterly Updated Portfolio Returns
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As with the aggregate estimation accuracy, the local advantage is more pronounced 
in the last few years of the buy and hold simulation and especially in 2013. Parallel to 
earlier research, we find some overperformance: 8.7% in annual average raw returns in 
favor of locals compared to Weisbenner and Ivković’s (2005) 3.2%, Coval and Mos-
kowitz’s (2001) 1.84% and Teo’s (2009) 3.72%. If portfolio volatility is taken into ac-
count, locals still performed better: they had overall better Sharpe ratios and performed 
better in 16 out of 24 quarters. However, compared to a passive index fund, the local 
portfolio achieved average success. It had better Sharpe ratios in 8 out of 24 quarters 
and achieved a lower average Sharpe ratio. If costs were taken into account this perfor-
mance would have been slightly worse. Intuitively, non-locals were clearly worse in all 
aspects compared to a simple index fund. 
In quarterly updated simulation the most recent target price information is imple-
mented and previous expectations are discarded. This results in higher portfolio turno-
vers. Often in the investing quarter there were few stocks with extraordinarily high re-
turns and thus current positions needed to be liquidated and new ones opened. Unsur-
prisingly, locals succeeded consistently in this endeavor. Local portfolio achieved an 
average quarterly return of 3.3%, compared to 0.9% for non-locals and 2.6% for the 
passive index fund. In annual terms this would be around 13.8%, 3.8% and 10.9% re-
spectively. Difference compared to previous simulation comes from the fact that the last 
(positive) year is not included fully in this simulation. However, it seems probable that 
buy and hold strategy is better for non-locals and locals even without taking into ac-
count trading costs. Again the local advantage was evident in target prices made across 
all four quarters. Additionally, Local portfolio had better Sharpe ratios than Non-Local 
in 14 out of the 24 quarters, albeit on average only in Q3 and Q4, best average rank and 
achieved a more investor-friendly return range. 
Compared to a passive index fund, the Local enjoyed better average quarterly returns 
and the Non-Local worse. The range of returns was wider for the Local than for the pas-
sive index fund. Consequently, the Local portfolio had lower overall average Sharpe 
ratio. It did have better quarterly Sharpe than an index fund in 8 out of the 24 quarters 
signaling volatile performance. This reported overall average performance is in line 
with Da and Schaumburg (2011) and Brav and Lehavy (2001) who hypothesized that 
the target prices analysts have some positive investment value. However, it is clear that 
these profits are not high enough to warrant criticism of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Local portfolio excess returns are not statistically significant (p-level 0.37). This is in 
line with Huang, Mian & Sankaraguruswamy (2009) who report non-significant coeffi-
cient for target price revision portfolios and the five-factor model. 
To model the effect of costs and the selection of starting year for the simulation, a 
hypothetic investment plan was tested. It is presented in Figure 12. Portfolios were up-
dated every quarter and two-way costs (everything sold and everything purchased) were 
88 
incurred. The results indicate that with a more volatile performance, the Local portfolio 
returned barely more than a simple index fund after costs. As expected, the Non-Local 
fared much worse than both the index fund and the Local portfolio ending with overall 
negative return on capital invested whereas the Local received a return of around 152% 
and the passive index fund around 149%. 
 
Figure 12: Quarterly updated portfolio value progression. 
To conclude, deriving expected returns from target prices and utilizing them to opti-
mize portfolios produces only in certain setting investing results that are in line with the 
measured forecast advantage. Locals are able to produce high returns in no short sales 
portfolios but with high risk. This is in line with their relatively better accuracy with 
extremely high target prices reported earlier. Only local analysts’ target prices seem to 
reflect average and somewhat consistent investment value if compared to foreign target 
prices. However, this value was mostly negative when compared to not utilizing analyst 
target prices. This was not a surprise after disappointing tests of accuracy. 
4.6.5 Possible explanations 
Why are results from simulations different? One explanation is that in the simulations 
where short selling was prohibited only highly optimistic accuracy matters. As was ear-
lier reported, locals exhibited on average better ability to separate extremely under-
priced stocks from highly underpriced stocks. To test this we ran a robustness check if 
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locals and non-locals were able to rank the 6 highest stocks better than a random ranker. 
This was not the case. Actually both groups were better rankers if all stocks in the index 
were included. However, locals were slightly better rankers in the stocks with the high-
est expectations. Additionally a simulation was run where short sales were allowed for 
buy and hold portfolios. The portfolio weights were extreme and subsequent investment 
success disastrous for locals. In this setting non-local portfolio was better in both returns 
and as stock return ranker. This was in some harmony with the differences in the 
groups’ abilities to forecast extreme price changes – locals were better at the positive 
upswings and non-locals relatively better on downswings. 
In the two first simulations short sales were allowed and average returns were re-
ceived. One of the explanations for this might stem from the larger samples of target 
prices that were averaged to derive expected returns: for year to year portfolios there 
were around 800 target prices for all 21 or 22 stocks and for the two latter portfolios 
only a part of the target price yearly sample. As there were some stocks that had one or 
two target prices, these might have been more prone to individual error and subsequent-
ly cause unhealthy portfolio weights. It would seem that the larger the analyst crowd the 
better the performance as was reported with regards to estimation accuracy. Quarterly 
updated and buy and hold portfolios were additionally tested with mainly the first 
months’ target prices. This reduced the sample to approximately one third. The perfor-
mances were counterintuitively higher than those reported above. Hence, increasing 
(decreasing) the number of forecasts to average does not seem to uniformly improve 
(decrease) performance. 
Another possible explanation is that the stocks available for selection were from in-
dustries where local/non-locals have an advantage. Alternatively, perhaps returns were 
mostly generated in sectors where either group had an accuracy advantage. This hy-
pothesis was evident only in Financials sector where a better statistically significant 
PMAFE coincided with better investment success in all portfolio settings. However, in 
other sectors this was not evident. Full breakdown of returns by sector is in Appendix II. 
Differences could stem from the optimization method used. As was earlier discussed, 
return inputs are used in conjunction with historic estimates of variances and correla-
tions. Portfolio performances could be affected by errors in the latter or errors in the 
optimization algorithm. A test was run for buy and hold portfolios without short selling 
where all returns for all stocks were set each year at 10%. Consequently portfolio opti-
mization reduced to minimizing expected variance. This portfolio produced statistically 
significantly higher Sharpe ratios than the passive index. Hence, it can be concluded 
that reported low performance probably was not caused by noisy variance-covariance-
matrix estimates. Moreover, the difference in Sharpe ratios was significantly positive 
between constant return portfolios and both Local (p-level 0.005) and Non-Local portfo-
lios (p-level <0.001) in favor of the minimum variance portfolio. Average and median 
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returns were in addition improved. It could be concluded that adding erroneous return 
estimates to portfolio optimization produced weak performance. 
To conclude, the linkage between investment value and the local advantage is noisy. 
This was expected as estimation accuracy was discovered to be very limited and de-
pendent on various aspects. No proposed accuracy measure produces a clear correlation 
with investment results in all simulations. The local investing advantage is dependent on 
simulation method and constraints used. The clearest link between ranking and direc-
tional accuracy and investment success were found in control groups: Best and Worst 
portfolios produced harmonious results. Increasing the sample size is expected to in-
crease the possibility to statistically separating the better estimators from others. How-
ever, the problem of this method is the dependence on real data as analyst accuracy is 
fairly complex and thus pseudo target prices hard to produce. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis provided a broad analysis of the local and foreign analysts covering Finnish 
equities. Additionally, a portfolio model for testing investment value of target prices 
was proposed and tested. The main finding of this thesis is that there is no uniform local 
advantage for the analysts covering Finnish stocks. Instead there are several sector-
specific, statistically but not necessarily economically significant local advantages that 
seem to be related to proximities to key markets and not to proximities to headquarters. 
Investing on local analyst estimates provided higher returns than an index fund but with 
a higher risk in some simulation configurations. Investing on non-local target prices 
provided generally unattractive returns if short selling was prohibited. The local ad-
vantage was deemed to be not sufficiently profitable in any simulation configuration. 
This has clear importance for the public of target prices, who are often retail investors. 
The first part of the thesis analyzed coverage decisions, expected returns, leader-
follower ratios and reactions for local and non-local analysts. It was discovered that 
locals covered industrial and consumer sectors in excess, whereas non-locals focused on 
financials, energy and telecom. Study of expected returns confirmed over-optimism for 
both groups. Local over-optimism was lower than non-local over-optimism and evident 
in all sectors, where non-local over-optimism was concentrated on three sectors. Study 
of expected returns for both groups revealed that non-local expectations fitted better a 
linear model including beta, average expectations and past return variables indicating 
that local target prices were more idiosyncratic. However, this was not true in all sec-
tors. It was discovered that both local and non-local target price dispersion predicted 
future volatility. The predictive power was greater for non-locals, but both groups un-
derrepresented the true future volatility. Neither group could be distinguished as a lead-
er providing markets with new information. Market reactions to target price revisions 
were small, positive and indifferent to analyst location. The clearest case was in stock 
markets for positive local updates, but even then the excess return could not be inter-
preted as capturing the proposed alpha of the new target price. The options markets re-
acted by lowering implied volatilities around announcement dates, but the markets 
made no difference to analyst location. 
Second part of the thesis focused on target price accuracy. Comparison of best/worst 
ratios provided limited results: worst estimators were slightly more frequently non-local 
and best estimators local. Consensus estimates were tested against individual estimates 
and it was discovered that averaging target prices usually resulted in better estimates 
than using individual forecasts. Averaging additionally resulted in non-local average 
estimates topping local average estimates in 6 out of 9 sectors. On the aggregate level, 
local advantage was found significant, but only when measured with PMAFE. A closer 
inspection revealed that locals were statistically significantly more accurate in 5 sectors 
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and less accurate in one. These sectors were additionally covered more actively by lo-
cals and were usually sectors where local market knowledge was warranted. The local 
advantage was only evident in 5 out of 9 years. These subsamples show that local ad-
vantage varies depending on the sample period, the accuracy measure, the sector and on 
expectation level. Overall, analyst target prices provided little forecasting abilities and 
estimated signs of future price changes correctly in 46.0% of cases for locals and in 
45.0% of cases for non-locals. Interestingly, locals were more accurate in the stocks 
with high expectations and non-locals more accurate with unattractive stocks. The dif-
ferences in accuracy were not due to notably different error distributions. 
The third part of this thesis formed ex ante mean-variance efficient portfolios in four 
simulations with local and non-local target prices. In the most simplistic simulations the 
best estimators’ portfolio performed better than the worst estimator portfolio supporting 
the proposed method. Local portfolio exhibited traits identified in earlier parts of the 
thesis: lower expectations and better accuracy. However, these traits did not always 
translate into investment success. When constrained with the same 10% limit as OMX 
Helsinki 25 Index, the Non-Local portfolio dominated the Local portfolio and ended 
close to the investing performance of a passive index fund. This superior performance 
compared to Local was not dependent on the start year. When the 10% constraint was 
removed, superior performance of non-local target prices persisted. If portfolios were 
formed quarterly to be held for a year or a quarter and with no short selling, locals per-
formed consistently better in both returns and in Sharpe ratios with both buy and hold 
annual portfolios and quarterly updated portfolios. The local portfolios had higher aver-
age returns than a passive index fund with higher volatility. Portfolios formed by non-
local target prices enjoyed consistently unattractive returns if short-selling was disal-
lowed. However, none of these results were statistically significant due to small sam-
ples. Refraining from estimating returns at all did produce statistically significantly 
higher returns than utilizing either local or foreign target prices. 
To conclude, the local advantage is more evident in estimation accuracy than in in-
vesting simulations in our sample. An investor faces many obstacles if target prices are 
to be invested upon: identifying the optimal estimator sample size, choosing allowing 
short-selling and weight constraints and deciding which, if any, accuracy measure is 
sufficiently consistent to identify the optimal group of analysts. Retail investors should 
probably favor a passive index fund, refrain from estimating returns altogether or seek 
to gain access best analysts. Taking the target price information at face value is not rec-
ommended. 
The results of this thesis deepen the knowledge on target price estimation, widen and 
diversify the picture on the local advantage, update views on Finnish equity research 
and propose a method to test investment value of a group of estimators. However, our 
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sample covered an unusual period of two crises, so a more valid generalization in other 
markets and in other times is left for future studies. 
Different parts of this thesis allow further interpretations. The analyst field seems to 
acknowledge the existence of the local advantage in their coverage decisions. Market 
reactions to target price announcements were small, possibly because the investment 
value of target prices is limited and they incorporated many aspects of actual accuracy. 
The proposed local investment advantage was not reflected in aggregate level market 
reactions. Could it be deduced that foreign analyst coverage is somewhat irrational or 
rather complementary? Analyst dispersion showed a remarkably better predictive power 
in forecasting volatility than analyst return estimations. As volatilities and returns are 
correlated could analyst dispersion be used to predict returns better than using just re-
turns? Both groups benefited in accuracy from forming consensus estimates, which ex-
plains the existence of large groups of analysts instead of just using best analysts. How 
is information aggregated in the market? 
Several interesting future research topics arose. A more refined and detailed analysis 
of sector dependence of local advantage is needed to study the role of different kinds of 
information in the equity analysis. The predictive power of analyst dispersion should be 
tested against other predictive variables such as implied volatility. Analyst portfolio 
performance versus passive indexing in exceptional times should be further examined 
and similar tests with recommendation data and different variance-covariance-matrix 
estimation ran. Analyst forecasting abilities and investing value in crisis years should be 
additionally examined. The asymmetry of accuracy depending on positive or negative 
expectation levels needs further research. Analysts should be surveyed to shed light on 
expectation formation. Investors that use analysts should be studied to uncover why 
they listen to certain analysts and how target price is received. 
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OMX Helsinki Constituents at the start of the year. Stocks marked in light blue are not 
available for portfolio simulation due to headquarters in Sweden or best analyst estima-
tion missing. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Amer Sports Amer Sports Cargotec Cargotec 
Cargotec Cargotec Elisa Elisa 
Elisa Elisa Fortum Fortum 
Fortum Fortum Kesko Kesko 
Huhtamaki Konecranes Konecranes Konecranes 
KCI Konecranes Kesko KONE KONE 
Kesko KONE Metso Metso 
KONE Metso Neste Oil Neste Oil 
Metso M-real Nokia Nokia 
M-real Neste Oil Nokian Renkaat Nokian Renkaat 
Neste Oil Nokia Nordea Bank Nordea Bank 
Nokia Nokian Renkaat Outokumpu Outokumpu 
Nokian Renkaat Nordea Bank Outotec Outotec 
Nordea Outokumpu Pohjola Pankki Pohjola Pankki 
OKO Pankki Outotec Ramirent Rautaruukki 
Outokumpu Rautaruukki Rautaruukki Sampo 
Rautaruukki Sampo Sampo Sanoma 
Sampo Sanoma-WSOY Sanoma Stora Enso 
Sanoma-WSOY Stora Enso Stora Enso Talvivaara 
Stora Enso TeliaSonera TeliaSonera TeliaSonera 
TeliaSonera TietoEnator TietoEnator Tieto 
TietoEnator UPM-Kymmene UPM-Kymmene UPM-Kymmene 
UPM-Kymmene Uponor Uponor Wärtsilä 
Wartsila Wärtsilä Wärtsilä YIT 






2011 2012 2013 2014 
Cargotec Amer Sports Amer Sports Amer Sports 
Elisa Cargotec Cargotec Cargotec 
Fortum Elisa Elisa Elisa 
Kemira Fortum Fortum Fortum 
Kesko Kemira Kemira Huhtamaki 
Konecranes Kesko Kesko Kemira 
KONE Konecranes Konecranes Kesko 
Metso KONE KONE Konecranes 
Neste Oil Metso Metso KONE 
Nokia Neste Oil Neste Oil Metso 
Nokian Renkaat Nokia Nokia Neste Oil 
Nordea Bank Nokian Renkaat Nokian Renkaat Nokia 
Orion Nordea Bank Nordea Bank Nokian Renkaat 
Outokumpu Orion Orion Nordea Bank 
Outotec Outokumpu Outokumpu Orion 
Pohjola Pankki Outotec Outotec Outokumpu 
Rautaruukki Pohjola Pankki Pohjola Pankki Outotec 
Sampo Rautaruukki Rautaruukki Pohjola Pankki 
Sanoma Sampo Sampo Rautaruukki 
Stora Enso Sanoma Sanoma Sampo 
TeliaSonera Stora Enso Stora Enso Stora Enso 
Tieto TeliaSonera TeliaSonera TeliaSonera 
UPM-Kymmene UPM-Kymmene UPM-Kymmene UPM-Kymmene 
Wärtsilä Wärtsilä Wärtsilä Wärtsilä 
YIT YIT YIT YIT 
Table 20: OMX 25 Constituents. Light blue marks missing constituents due to 




Table 21: Portfolio returns by sector. 
Sector
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Total Net Return -0,11 0,18 0,61 3,88 2,98 3,39
Difference
Share of index
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Total Net Return 0,68 0,05 0,14 -0,54 -0,22 -0,15
Difference
Share of index
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local




Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Total Net Return 0,48 0,41 0,36 0,29 2,15 0,79
Difference
Share of index
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Total Net Return 0,39 0,49 -0,06 -0,33 0,25 0,00
Difference
Share of index
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local




Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Total Net Return 0,15 0,15 0,53 0,13 0,15 -0,27
Difference
Share of index
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local
Total Net Return 0,06 0,05 -0,06 -0,01 0,02 0,00
Difference
Share of index
Local Non-Local Local Non-Local Local Non-Local








9 % 22 % 30 %
1 2 3
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9 % 22 % 30 %
0,00 -0,41 0,51
5 % 8 % 8 %
Yearly Buy and Hold Portfolios Without Short Sales
